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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION I
i
Nuclear Power Plant Fault Diagnostics
I
Since the accidents at the Three-Mile Island (TMI) and m
Chernobyl nuclear power plants (NPPs), the safety of NPPs has
become an even more important concern to both the nuclear power N
J
industry and the general public. The demand for safer plants has
ever since. Responding to the demand, many scientists n
i
increased
have investigated augmenting NPP safety in various ways. For
m
example, innovative reactor designs, better safety system R
designs, human factor studies, stricter safety regulations, and i
m
so on, have been developed and implemented in the years since
the above-mentioned accidents. N
It is, however, imprudent to assume that the possibility of
an accident can be totally eliminated. Despite continual i
technical innovation and knowledge accumulation, the possibility n
M
of an accident is never zero. Human error factors, such as
misdiagnosis, misinterpretation, or intentional human error i
i
(sabotage), are involved. Concentrating efforts on obtaining
!
!
2accurate diagnoses, and prescribing corrective actions when
undesirable situations evolve, may be a more important and
tractable approach than trying to remove completely all such
possibilities case by case. This kind of approach will
ameliorate NPP safety with less cost.
In order to control a potentially unsafe situation or
condition properly and in a timely manner, accurate diagnoses
should be made as soon as possible. Such accurate and rapid
diagnoses will allow more time for the operators to respond to
unsafe situations. They can concentrate on remedying or
mitigating them rather than spending time determining the plant
operating status. If the exact diagnosis can be performed by a
computer-aided adviser, the possibility of human error would be
eliminated. In addition, other advantages that the computer-
aided adviser can offer include; fast diagnoses of anomalies,
enumeration of the causes of anomalous conditions, and
assistance for the operators in their decision process.
Consequently, a computer-aided, fault-diagnostic adviser, used
in the NPP control room or technical support center, requires
the capability of early detection and accurate classification of
operating transients in the NPPo
Artificial Neural Network Fault-Diagnostic Adviser
An artificial neural network (ANN) is one of many different
335
3artificial intelligence (AI) techniques that can be used as a
fault-diagnostic adviser [7] [8]. In applications of AI to
classification and pattern recognition, the ANN paradigms may be
the most appropriate.
An ANN fault-diagnostic adviser uses given examples as its
model. It learns similarities among complex and multifarious
input information. During the learning process, the ANN adviser
generalizes the characteristics of the given examples so that it
is able to identify unfamiliar or novel input information based
on similarities of that inputs with the known examples. The
generalization characteristic enables the ANN to interpolate (or
extrapolate) new input information and also gives it a degree of
robustness against noisy or faulty input information. These
noise- and fault-tolerance capabilities enable the ANN adviser
to correctly diagnose a symptom even under a corrupted input
condition.
Mathematically, the generalization characteristic is
analogous to inferring an exact function from a given, limited
sample set [13] [25] [36] [37]. In other words, an ANN
generalizes a relationship between general input and output
information by inferring a multidimensional and nonlinear
mapping based on the given samples (or examples). However, the
mapping in an ANN scheme is done by weight interconnections
which cannot be delineated into a simple mathematical form.
After an ANN establishes the relationship satisfactorily through
336
4the learning process, its classification or diagnosis is
immediately determined when a question is asked of it. It
doesn't go through the learning process again.
A number of scientists have investigated the application of
an ANN to enhance NPP safety. Uhrig [29] (1989) has proposed the
utilization of an ANN to identify causes of perturbations in a
steam generator. Rob, Cheon and Chang [23] (1991) have applied
an ANN to predict reactor thermal power. Upadhyaya and Eryurek
[30] (1992) have used an ANN as an estimator of process
variables and a method of sensor validation technique in a NPP.
Guo and Uhrig [12] (1992) have applied an ANN to analyze the
thermodynamic behavior of the Tennessee Valley Authority's
Sequoyah NPP. Bartlett [4] [5] (1992) has investigated
application of an ANN to NPP status diagnostics.
Error _alysis for _ Diagnostio Results
One drawback of the ANN is its inability to validate its
diagnosis for the input conditions that are not in its training
examples. This validation concern restricts the application of
the ANN to areas where the input conditions are not notably
different from the traini,g examples, where the verification of
the results is not a great concern, or where the ANN has other
means of authentication.
In NPP fault diagnostics, the validation process is crucial
33?
5in order to implement an ANN fault-diagnostic adviser in a real
NPP [5]. The ANN diagnosis for a symptom in the plant, which is
not validated, may mislead operators in the control room to
analyze nonexisting or incorrect plant conditions during
corrective and mitigative actions. Such a misdirection is
contrary to the objectives of the original ANN fault-diagnostic
adviser. Thus, a validation or an error estimation _n an ANN's
result must be provided to the NPP operators. Error analysis for
ANNs is a relatively new field that will significantly
contribute to improving both the credibility of the ANN fault-
diagnostic adviser and NPP safety.
In this thesis, an ANN fault-diagnostic adviser for a NPP
has been developed, and an error prediction method, suitable for
the fault-diagnostic adviser, has been applied to validate the
diagnostic results of the adviser.
338
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CHAPTER 2. BACKPROPAGATION NEURAL NETWORK THEORY
Introduction
Backpropagation is the most widely applied and investigated
ANN paradigm. In 1969, backpropagation was proposed by Bryson
and Ho [2] and separately introduced by Werbos in 1974 [33], but
it was largely ignored and unappreciated. Rumelhart rediscovered
L
backpropagation with his research group members in 1985 [24].
Since Rumelhart's rediscovery, backpropagation has become one of
the classic ANN paradigms and has been applied to various
fields.
A backpropagationANN is made of simple computational units
(or nodes) connected to one another by weights. A gradient
descent method is used to build a set of weight connections in
the typical feedforward, multi-layered network used in
backpropagation [13] [25] [34]. In this chapter, the theory of
the backpropagation learning algorithm will be illustrated.
339
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7Backpzopagatlon Neural Network Architeoture
Backpropagation is designed to determine weights in a
hierarchial and fully interconnected ANN architecture (see
Figure 2.1). The interconnections are structured to fan out
between nodes and between layers. The backpropagation
architecture contains one or more hidden layers between the
input layer and the output layer. The interconnections of the
nodes in the layers are accomplished through variable weights.
In other words, the processing elements or nodes, interconnected
by the weights, constitute the parallel, distributed
inforlmation-processing structure [13] [19]. The backpropagation
neural network of the parallel, distributed information-
processing structure carries out an approximation or inference
of a bounded mapping (multidimensional, linear, or nonlinear
mapping).
Mathematically, the network information-processing mapping
may be expressed as a functional relationship f from a subset A
of a m-dimensional Euclidian vector space to a bounded subset
f{A} of a n-dimensional Euclidean vector space [13], where
f: A c R m " Rn {I)
such that
340
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Figure 2.1 : An example of a 4-layer neural network
341
A learning set consisting of k examples, (xr,y,), (_,Y2), ...,
(_,Yk), is used to infer f. Each example contains an input
pattern _ and an desired output (or target) pattern y_. Note
that those input-output patterns having m and n components,
respectively, are equivalent to vectors in hyperspace.
The examples are generated by selecting the _ vectors
randomly from the subset A with a fixed probability
distribution. The Yk vectors in the subset f{A} correspond to the
selected _ vectors. In general, the more appropriate the
selection of the k examples, the more accurate the approximation
of f. During the learning process, examples (patterns) are
presented in turn, randomly, or all at once as in batch
learning, to the network.
Backpzopagation &lgor£tbm
_eedforward flow
As illustrated in the previous section, the backpropagation
architecture contains one or more hidden layers between the
input layer and the output layer. In the feedforward activation
flow [19], the input layer, consisting of input nodes, simply
z .
receives the individual components of a presented example, an
342
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input vector. Each component of the input vector is distributed
to each of the nodes in the second layer with weight
multiplication (see Figure 2.2). Note that there is no sigmoidal
activation of the nodes in this input layer since the input to
an input node is the output of that node.
After the input layer, the individual nodes of a next layer
carry out the summation of each output of the nodes in the
preceding layer, multiplied by their associated weights. This
mechanism, delineated in Figure 2.2, is referred to as
feedforward activation. The activation of each node is
determined by using a sigmoidal activation function, or transfer
function. The activations and distributions continue in a
forward or upward manner. The final output, or decision at the
output layer, is produced after all successive upward
activations in previous layers are completed. Details of the
feedforward activation follow.
Let O_ denote the output of node i in layer p. Weight w_
connects from node j in layer p-i to node i. ei is a bias for
node i. See Figure 2.2. The activation of the node i is
calculated using the following rule,
- + (3)]
where f is the logistic activation (or sigmoid) function,
f(x) - z (4)
1 .exp (-x)
343
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I
%i
Opi = 1/[l+exp(-,SUM)]
SUM => wij Op-1j+ e i
/
wij-1 ij j+ 1
t
• • Q • | ai | • • •
Op-1j-1 Op-lj Op-1i+1
Figure 2.2: Feedforward activation for a neural network
344
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Namely, the activation of node i is calculated using the sigmoid
function on the sum of the weighted inputs to the node.
Once the feedforward activation flow is accomplished, the
output of the network may not be the desired result for a given
input. Thus, the network needs a learning process to produce the
desired output. This learning process is performed by backward
error propagation [13] [25].
Backward error DroDaaation
The backward error propagation (BEP) adjusts the weights
connected between two successive layers in order to provide the
des ired results. The weights are updated recurs ively in
accordance with
wij(n+l)=wi>Cn)+_6piO_j._(wij(n) - wijCn-l) ) (5)
where _ is the learning rate, n is the training number, u is the
momentum coefficient, and 6¢ is the error of node i. The error
6_ is calculated by the delta rule in the final layer and by the
generalized delta rule in the hidden layers. Thus, first step of
the BEP process is to calculate the error of each output node,
and to adjust the connected weights by the backpropagation
learning laws.
Delta rule A weight, connecting the output node and a
345
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hidden node in the uppermost hidden layer, is adjusted by Eq. 5
coupled with the delta rule [25] [34]. The delta rule is used to
compute the error 6_i at the output node i as follows.
where t i is the desired (or target) output. Namely, the error is
calculated based on the difference between the desired output
and the actual output for the node, multiplied by the derivative
of the node. Note that 0_(i-0_) is the derivative of the sigmoid
function.
Generalized delta ru_e The next step is to adjust the
weights connected between two successive hidden layers. For the
weight adjustments, the error 6_ of a hidden node in the upper
hidden layer must be known. However, the desired output of the
hidden node is not explicitly known. To resolve the difficulty,
Widrow and others have developed the generalized delta rule to
infer the error of the hidden node [19] [34]. The error is
estimated by propagating the computed errors of the output layer
in the backward direction.
The error 6_ for a hidden node i between two successive
hidden layers, p-th and (p+l)-th layers, is displayed as
346
The 6p_is associated with the errors of those k hidden nodes in
the upper hidden layer, multiplied by the weights connected to
the node i. The derivative of the sigmoid function is then
applied to the summed value. This estimated error is used in
updating the weight according to Eq. 5. The generalized delta
rule can be applied repeatedly to the next lower hidden layers
when the ANN architecture has multiple hidden layers. According
to these rules, weights are adjusted to learn a set of presented
examples.
The feedforward and the BEP processes continue until the
network's learning error becomes less than a predetermined value
(or target learning accuracy). A set of weights, obtained from
the learning procedure, represents the mapping that the network
has approximated.
The backpropagation paradigm is not only one type of ANN,
but also a generalizer as will be explained in the next chapter
[35] [36] [37]. The backpropagation ANN will be employed in a
stacked generalization scheme to predict the generalization
error of a generalizer, described in Chapter 4 [37].
3471
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CHAPTER 3. GENEI_LI ZATION
Introduction
Generalization is one of the most desirable characteristics
in various scientific applications. For example, in the fields
of statistics, AI, and ANNs, generalization from given
experimental data is essential in solving the problem of
determining the best model for a given data set. The best,
generalized, model will be able to predict (interpolate or
extrapolate) a group of variables as closely as possible.
In addition, generalization enables a system to cope with
noises and faults caused by irregular and novel environmental
factors in real-world applications, such as in speech
recognition, pattern recognition, image reconstruction, control
optimization, and so on. Usually, noises and faults come from
outside the system. Therefore, a well generalized system (the
best model) will respond correctly even to novel or degraded
inputs. Memorization, in contrast to generalization, cannot
provide proper responses to novel or degraded information. A
348
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s_stem that has memorized a given data set will fail to show
correct responses to novel input information.
In real-world problems, a system faces external noises or
novel information frequently. Without the generalization
capability, noisy and novel inputs degrade the abilities of the
system to perform its intended function. These degraded
solutions are undesirable and unreliable. Obviously,
generalization is an important consideration in solving the
real-world problems in order for the system to produce a well-
behaved solution.
In NPP fault diagnostics, when a novel or unidentified
plant condition is presented to an ANN fault-diagnostic adviser,
the adviser has to be capable of detecting and diagnosing the
unidentified condition. Early and accurate diagnoses should be
provided to the plant operators even under noisy- and faulty-
information. Typically, the noisy- and faulty-information come
from the plant variable monitoring system at the NPP. Thus, even
under the noisy- and faulty-information, fast and accurate
fault-diagnoses must be realized. Consequently, generalization
is a significant factor in designing a fault-diagnostic adviser
for a NPP.
Generalization
One of the goals of AI is to create a human-like system
349
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that possesses two kinds of logical inference abilities. Namely,
the human-like system has both the deductive inference ability
and the inductive inference ability. Each inference ability
yields different kinds of knowledge [i0]. The deductive
inference corresponds to a rule- or data-based intelligence,
similar to memorization. In the same way, the inductive
inference corresponds to generalization. For example, suppose
that a teacher lectured a student on how to solve a problem in
a textbook. If, in an exam, the same type of problem is asked of
the student, the exam will measure the student's deductive
inference ability (or memorization). If a problem, made up by
applying the acquired knowledge from solving the taught problem,
is asked of the student, the exam will measure the student's
inductive inference ability (or generalization). Thus, the
generalization is the inductive inference that is more essential
element to simulate the functions of human intelligence.
Generalization is difficult to achieve in AI.
Mathematically speaking, generalization is analogous to
inferring an objective function from a given sample set. Many
times, the objective function is referred to as a parent
function [36] [37]. The given set consisting of input-output
vector pairs, used in the above inference process, is referred
to as a learning set. Wolpert [36] defines generalization as the
ability of a system to make a good guess as to the output vector
for an input vector not included in the learning set. Since
350
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generalization takes place without a priori knowledge of novel
input infoz-mation, it is analogous to educated guessing. This
kind of intelligent guessing is performed by looking for
similarities between the novel input information and previously
learneC _nowledge.
F_om a statistical viewpoint generalization can also be
regarded as simply a statistical curve fitting [36]. In other
words, the acquiring the generalization characteristic from a
given learning set is analogous to the searching for the best
model that fits experimental data in statistics. In ANN
paradigms, the best model fitting is performed by searching for
the best weight& zombinations from infinite sets of weights.
In addition, generalization (or generalization accuracy) is
used aa a measure of the intelligence of a system [36]. As an
application tc ANN learning, a system can be evaluated by
generalization accuracy rather than by learning accuracy. Using
this measure, a system can also be optimized to have the least
generalization error for a given data set.
GeneraXizezs
An algorithm, which infers a parent function from a limited
learning set, is called a generalizer [36] [37]. A generalizer
is trained, or taught, with a learning set, { <xI,Yl), (_,Y2),
•.. , (_,Yk) }, consisting of k pairs of input-output patterns.
19
The input vector _ and the output vector Yk have m and n
components, respectively. When a question vector q, having m
components, is asked of the generalizer, the generalizer will
guess the corresponding output that is induced from its internal
knowledge.
The generalizer is defined more precisely as follows.
Suppose that each pair, (_,yp) in a data space of m m x R",
constitutes a learning set in data space R _."_, such that {
(_,Yp) I I S p S k, Xp = (x,,x_,...,x.) E R m =, Yp (YJ,Y2,''',Y,)
E L" }, where L represents the space of real numbers. Thus,
and yp represent input and output vectors (patterns) in L m+",
respectively. L k_+_ represents the k-th order data space of k
input-output pairs in the learning set. The order of the
learning set is then defined to be k, the number of patterns in
the data space. Wolpert defines an m-dimensional generalizer {
G I Gi, 0 S i < _ ; i is integer } to be a countably infinite set
of continuous mappings from a subset of L k_+_+m to L" [36]. The
L m in the L km+"_+m term represents a question data space. Ln
4
represents the n-dimensional output vector space. Note that the
dimension of a generalizer is defined to be the dimension of
input data space, m in this case.
'te 'Generalizer crl rla
To complete the definition of a generalizer, several
restrictions must be imposed. Hence, a generalizer should
352
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satisfy the following criteria [36]:
The first restriction pertains to the order of the patterns
in the data space. The order of the presentation of data to a
generalizer must be irrelevant. Namely, a generalizer is
invariant to the presentation order of the data. Thus,
1. Every generalizer Gi is invariant under
permutation of the data space.
The second restriction pertains to the reproduction of the
learning set. When a generalizer Gi is asked a question from the
learning set, the generalizer Gi must reproduce an output vector
from the learning set, corresponding to the input question
vector. This criterion is subject to learning accuracy.
2. When the Gi is asked a question that is
the same as an input vector in the data space,
the Gi generates the same output vector in
the data space, corresponding to the input
vector.
The third restriction states that the domain of G i is
single-valued. In other words, two or more outputs corresponding
to a single input vector cannot be allowed.
353
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3. For any Gi, if any input vector in the data
space is identical to another input vector in
other data space, then they must have the
same output vector.
The next restriction refers to the least number of input-
output patterns in a learning set. Hence, a generalizer needs
sufficient input-output vectors (learning examples) in the
learning set in order to possess generalization characteristic.
4. _ is defined only if k > m, where k = order
of the learning set and m = dimension of the
generalizer.
The last criteria refers to a necessary dimensionality of
the input vectors in a learning set. For examl _e, assume m = 2.
In this case an input vector in the learning set has two
components. If all input vectors are colinear (i.e., the l-
dimensional hyperplane is identical to a line), then this
learning set provides information about the line to be
generalized. Hence, the learning set cannot provide sufficient
information about the points not on the line (i.e.,
generalization is not possible with such a limited learning
set). A generalizer requires the components of all input vectors
in a learning set to lie on, at least, the same dimensional
_- 354
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hyperplane as that of the generalizer. This is expressed as
follows.
5. Even if k > m, Gi is not defined if the
components of all input vectors in the
learning set, (x,,x_,...xm) _R', lie on
the same (m-l)-dimensional hyperplane.
There are many generalizers that satisfy these criteria.
For example, generalizers include backpropagation neural
networks [25] [35], Holland's classifier system [14], Rissanen's
minimum description length principle [22], memory-based
reasoning schemes [26], regularization theory [21], and surface
fitters of a parent function [9] [20] [36]. Of course none of
these generalizers cannot infer with infinite certainty an
entire parent function from a learning set.
Intuitively, if a generalizer is trained on a subset of the
learning set, the generalizer should be able to make an educated
guess at the rest of learning set. This is called self-guessing
[36]. Furthermore, by applying this self-guessing property, the
generalizer can estimate its own self-performance for untaughted
examples. Self-guessing can be considered as a different kind of
reproduction of the learning set and can be used to observe the
behavior of a generalizer for novel inputs. This self-guessing
of the remainder of the learning set is an application of the
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second criteria of generalization described in the previous
section. Self-guessing appears as cross-validation in statistics
[36].
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CHAPTER 4. ERROR PREDICTION OF GENERALIZER
Introduction
One obstacle to the application of ANNs to a real-world
situation has been the inability to assign error bounds to the
ANN results. An ANN result that contains a large error cannot be
reliable. Thus, ANNs can not be used in NPP fault diagnostics
without providing error bounds, figure of merits, or confidence
levels, on the ANN results. Validation of ANN results is crucial
in NPP fault diagnostics. This chapter will address the
validation concern for ANN results by applying the stacked
generalization technique [37]. In this chapter, stacked
generalization will be illustrated as a tool to define and
measure generalization error.
Nonparametric Statistics
As described in the previous chapter, self-guessing is
related to cross validation. Cross validation is one of many
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methods in nonparametric statistics developed by statisticians
since 1950 [31]. Therefore, it is advantageous to discuss
nonparametric statistics. But, first, a short discussion of
statistics in general will be presented.
Statistics is used to compare a set of experimental data,
or a theoretical model, with other data or models. Suppose that
there is two models, A and B. The question of which model fits
a set of given data better can be converted statistically to a
question of which one has better statistical parameters.
For example, the question of whether or not the average of
the elements in set A is larger than a similar average in set B
can be addressed in statistics as follows. Before the emergence
of nonparametric statistics, the standard statistical answer
would be obtained by using the t-statistic, which is the
difference between the average of the set A and the average of
the set B, divided by a certain quadratic function of all the
data. The divisor scales the difference between the two averages
for comparison with a single table. The computed t is compared
with its theoretical distribution calculated under the
assumption that all the given data were randomly drawn from the
same normal (Gaussian) distribution. For the normal
distribution, a standard table, called t-table, is tabulated. By
comparing a value in the table with the calculated value t from
the given data, the question of whether the set A is bigger than
set B is answered. Additionally, the question that set A is not
358
_
26
just accidentally bigger than set B can be answered by using the
t-table. Unfortunately, t-statistic is too idealized, based on
normal or Gaussian distribution, to apply it to many real-world
situations. If an observed data set does not follow normal
distribution, t is not quite an appropriate parameter to be used
for a statistical test. The statistical decision by this
parameter would not be accurate.
Nonparametric statisticians has developed ways to find
answers to questions of the sort discussed above for those data
sets that do not depend upon normal distribution [28] [26] [27]
[31] [34]. As the price for nondependence on normal
distributions, nonparametric statistics requires a huge
computational effort because a significance table must be
constructed for each set of data.
For example, let set A and set B have n and m elements,
respectively. Assume that we want to determine that set A has a
larger average than set B as before. First, in the nonparametric
method, the two sets are combined into a single set, C,
containing n+m elements. Then, a partition of set C is
arbitrarily made yielding two subsets. One of the subsets has n
elements, and another one has m elements. Note that there are a
total of (n+m)!/(n!m!) ways of partitioning the set C into two
subsets having n and m elements respectively. For a given
partition, the difference between the average of each
partitioned subset (the average of one subset minus the average
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of another subset) is computed. For all possible partitions,
there are (n+m)!/(n!m!) computed differences. Notice that among
the computed (n+m)!/(n!m!) differences, one of these differences
is the difference between the averages of set A and set B. These
(n+m)!/(n!m!) differences constitute a significance table for
this set C, corresponding to the t-table in normal distribution
statistics. Thus, the significance table is used to decide which
set has a statistically larger average. If the difference
between the averages of A and B, i.e., the average of A minus
the average of B, is in the upper 5% of the (n+m)!/(nim!)
difference values in the significance table, the set A has a
statistically larger average than the set B [28].
The statistical decision by this nonparametric method is
much more accurate and appropriate for cases depending upon non-
normal distributions, or an unknown distribution.
Cross Valldation
Selection of the best model for a given experimental data
set is an important consideration in many scientific
applications [18]. Additionally, how well the model performs and
how it is able to predict an experimental result is also of
crucial importance for the model. In nonparametric statistics,
cross validation addresses this concern. Cross validation has
been proposed by Stone [27] and Geisser [ii] in order to solve
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the problem of selecting appropriate models to fit observed or
experimental data.
The following discussion explains cross validation.
Consider the selection of the best model for a given data set
amongst many possible models. In cross validation, an arbitrary
model is chosen amongst available others. The given data set is
then randomly partitioned into two subsets, subset 02 having one
element and another subset 01 having the remaining of the data.
Then any method is used to fit the model to the partitioned
subset 01 . The model fitted to 01 is tested to see how well it
predicts the subset 02 . This is why the term is named cross
validation since the partitioned subset 82 is used to cross
validate the model developed by the another partitioned subset
01 . The main objective of the cross validation is to choose the
best model of many possible models by observing the behavior on
one part of the partitioned subsets, while the other part is
used to fit the model. The behavior of each model is compared
with that of different models, and then the best model is
selected. This is sometimes referred to as a winner-takes-ali
strategy because only the best model is selected for use by the
technique. A mathematical explanation of cross validation
follows [31].
Let N data points (xi,Yi) be generated by a parent function
y(x) on the interval [a,b] such that Yi E Y(Xi) + 8i where the _i
are independent normal random variables with mean 0 and a given
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standard deviation, and xi = a + i.(b-a)/N, i = i, 2, ... , N.
Suppose that h(x,u) is a class of curves h(x) fitted to the
given N data with a choice of the non-negative parameter u [31].
Hence, h(x,u) is defined to be the curve minimizing [31]
N
I---_.IN [ yi-h (x i) ]2 (8)
constrained by the following equation,
b
I d 2h (x)[ ]5 dx = _ (9)dx _-l
The constraint Eq. 9 is a smoothness condition: if u = 0,
the fitted curve h(x,=) is so smooth that the curve is a
straight line, as if it is fitted by the ordinary least squares
method. If u is large enough, h(x,u) will go through every data
point. This fits all the given data perfectly, but it is a very
irregular curve. Thus, the selection of the best fitted curve to
the parent function is dependent upon the parameter u. Cross
validation provides the best value of a among the given choices.
Selecting the best u means the minimization of the error of a
fitted curve, compared to the true parent function. In other
words, u is selected such that a curve h(x,u) for the selected
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is the closest to the true parent function. Cross validation
is performed as follows.
Let the given data set be L = { (_,Yi) [ i = integers, 0 S
i S N }. First, cansider a partition of L. The partition splits
L into two subsets, a pair (xi,yi) and the remainder of L. For
each choice of a partition i, let h(_(x,u) be a curve h(x)
satisfying constraint Eq. 9, and minimizing
N-1
1 _ [Yl - h(xl)]2N----Y (X0)
j,i
NOW, h(_(x,u) is a curve fitting the N-I data points that
satisfies the constraint in Eq. 9 by minimizing Eq. 8 without
the selected pair, (xi,yi). Next, in order to choose the best u,
(xi,Yi) is used to predict an expected error involved in fitting
the curve h(_(x,u). Note that the prediction of an error
corresponds to the observation of the behavior of the model on
one of partitioned subsets, when the model is fitted on the
other partitioned subset. Hence, for all partitions, define
N
O+(a)=-_- [y_- h:_)(x_)]2. (11)
ut minimizing Q(a) for all partitions. Now,Select the best u, ,
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the curve h(x,u t) is the best solution or model suggested by
cross validation in the class of h(x,u).
The selection of the best fitted curve h(x,u t) by cross
validation can be viewed as the choice of the generalizer Gi that
shows the highest generalization capability in a class of
generalizers. Similarly, the given data set in the cross
validation scheme corresponds to a learning set in
generalization. Note that the self-guessing characteristics of
generalization, described in the preceding chapter, is used in
cross validation.
Cross Validation is a winner-takes-all strategy by which
the best model is selected. As an application, cross validation
can be used as a method to pick the best generalizer G i among
possible generalizers. Additionally, cross validation can be
employed to estimate the average generalizing accuracy of a
generalizer for an unknown parent function which generated a
learning set. Wolpert has developed these ideas into stacked
generalization [37].
Stacked Generalisation
Stacked generalization can be thought of as an extension
application of cross validation. It was proposed by Wolpert [37]
to achieve a generalization accuracy that is as high as possible
for one or more generalizers. When used with multiple
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generalizer_J, stacked generalization can be viewed as a scheme
collecting and combining all the advantages of each generalizer,
rather than choosing only the best one, with respect to a
particular learning set. In other words, stacked generalization
maximizes the benefits from each generalizer by synthesizing
different advantages of the multiple generalizers to achieve
generalization accuracy that is as high as possible. Stacked
generalization is not a winner-takes-all strategy. W_en used
with a single generalizer, stacked generalization can b_ used to
estimate the error of a generalizer which is asked a novel
question or presented with a novel i_,_ut.
Stacked generalization is concerned with the problem of
inferring a parent function (mapping) from a given learning set.
In contrast with ANNs, generalizers, and cross validation,
stacked generalization tell us the wa_ to maximize the
generalization capabilities of a generalizer or multiple
generalizers. Stacked generalization, as _ sophisticated version
of cross validation, uses the following ideas.
First, create a partition of a learning set, train a
generalizer on one partitioned subset, then observe the
performance of the generalizer on the other partitioned subset.
The performance data from the partitioned subset constitutes a
new learning set. A new generalizer that is called a level 1
generalizer is then trained on the new learning set of the
performance data. The new generalizer can evaluate the
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performance of the first generalizer by this stacking procedure.
There are several different ways to implement stacked
generalization. In the next sections, the stacked generalization
scheme will be described in detail for both the cases of
multiple generalizers and of a single generalizer [37].
Cross validation partition set
Let set Q be the set of all questions q of interest. Q
corresponds to the universal set. From set Q, a subset L is
chosen to be a learning set used to train generalizers. Let L =
{ (zl,Yl), (_,Y2), -.- , (_,Y_) } consisting of k pairs of input-
output vectors, z _ Rm and y _ R". Figure 4.1 shows an
illustration of these ideas. When asked a novel question q E {
Q - L }, a generalizer can show how well it has generalized a
parent function with respect to the learning set L.
To employ stacked generalization, first, a set of r
partitions is chosen from the learning set L. For a partition i
where i is integer and 1 _ i _ r, L is split into two disjointed
sets, en and eu. The cross validation partition set (CVPS) is
defined to be r = k so that for all i, eu consists of a single
chosen element of L, and the corresponding ell consists of the
rest of L. Therefore, for all i, eu consists of a single pattern
of (_,Yi), the corresponding eil consists of the remainder of L,
{ L-(_,yi) }. Since r = k, the set of all eu covers the learning
set L. A partition is shown in Figure 4.1 by dividing L into two
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Q = {q} : Set of Ali Questions
{L-(x,y)} _/
Figure 4.1: Illustration of set Q.={ q I all questions}
and the cross validatlon partition set (CVPS)
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subsets, Su = (_,Yi) and 8ii = { L-(_,yi) }. Wolpert defines the
space of the original learning set L, R m x R", as the level 0
space. Any generalizer applied directly to L in the level 0
space is then referred to as the level 0 generalizer.
Stacked qeneralizat_on for multiple qeneralizers
suppose there is a set of p generalizers that we are
interested in, GI, _, ... , _. For a particular partition i, a
partitioned subset 8u consists of (x,y), and the other subset 8i,
consists of { L - (x,y) }. Note that the subscript for the
input-output pair is dropped for convenience. Given this
partition, the p generalizers are trained on the { L - (x,y) }
so that the generalizers learn the elements of 8il except for
(x,y). Then, all generalizers are asked the question x. For the
question x, a generalizer _, where 1 S n S p, produces an answer
g.. Generally, since the pair (x,y) is not used in training the
generalizer, the answer given by the generalizer is different
from the desired output y.
Now, we have just obtained from the generalizers G1, _, ...
, Gp, the answer gl, g2, -.- , gp, respectively, but the correct
answer is y (see Figure 4.2). This new information about the
level 0 generalizers' answers for a given question provides
knowledge of their generalization behaviors or accuracy. This
new information space is called the level 1 space. This
information is cast as a new learning set in the level i space,
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New Learning Set L'
(Level1) L' will be usedto train
° linG,
_' g2' '"' gp'y a level 1 generalizer
J/
/
I
g_ .... gp OriginalLearningSet
...... [ , L
G .... G1 p
trainedon
trainedon ,
L-(x,y) L-(x,y)
-- i
I
I
× ×
Level0 generalizers
Figure 4.2: Illustration of generating a new learning set
(level 1) by stacked generalization for multiple
generalizers
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illustrating the generalizers' generalization accuracy in the
level 0 space. Hence, a new level 1 learning set L' consists of
an input (gl, g2, "-" , gp) and the output y (or the correct
answer for the question). For other partitions of the original
learning set L, the generalizers will give other such pairs.
Taken together, these pairs constitute the new learning set L'.
A new generalizer G', referred to as the level i generalizer, is
trained on the level i learning set L' to provide a better
answer to the question q.
Next, train the level 0 generalizers GI, (;2, ... , Gp on all
of L and then ask them a novel question q _ { Q - L }. The
answers from the level 0 generalizers are fed as a question into
the level 1 generalizer G'. The level 1 generalizer's answer is
the final, and hopefully best, answer for the desired output y
(see Figure 4.3). In this stacked generalization scheme for
multiple generalizers, an answer given by the level 1
generalizer is determined by combining the answers of the
original p level 0 generalizers. In other words, the level 1
generalizer performs filtration of generalization errors on the
level 0 generalizers which are involved in each level 0
question.
The process of stacked generalization can be used
recursively (i.e. multiple stacking). The multiple stacking
results in level 2, level 3, and so on, higher level
generalizers. Sometimes, multiple stacking is not practical when
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I Answerfor
thequestionq
A
iii i I
LevelILearningSet
L' LevelIGeneralize_
G'
........D- (trainedonL')
outputy
gpgl ' " ' " ' "
LearninigSet l
I • • 8
trained on L ID- traim_l on L
i
I,' ...+,..II I
Questionq
Figure 4.3: Zllustration of a level 1 generalizer with a
question
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computation time for learning is large.
Stacked qeneralization for a sinqle qeneralize_
Let G be a single generalizer and the original learning set
be the same one, L, described in the previous section (see
Figure 4.4). A question q _ Q lies outside of L. As in Figure
4.4, for a partition i, L is split into two subsets { L - (x,y)
} and (x,y). Given the partition, the level 0 generalizer G is
trained on the subset { L - (x,y) }. Then G is asked x as a
question which is not used in training G. An answer, g, given by
G for the question x will be, in general, different from the
correct answer (output) y. In addition to this information, the
vector x' defined as the distance from x to its nearest neighbor
in { L - (x,y) } is computed. Now, when the question is x, and
the vector from x to its nearest neighbor in the learning set is
x' the correct answer differs from the level 0 generalizer's
answer by g - y. The error information along with x and x'
defines the level 1 information space for this case of a single
generalizer. This information forms a new learning set L' in the
level 1 space. Hence, the new level 1 learning set L' consists
of an input (x,x') and an output g - y for the particular
partition. For the other partitions of L, the generalizer G will
give such pairs. Those pairs constitute the level 1 learning set
L'. A new generalizer G' (level 1 generalizer) is then trained
on the level 1 learning set L' (refer to Figure 4.5).
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Level 1 LearningSet
!
New input x, x' L' will be used to train
outputg-y a level1 generalizer
i
Error = g-y
g Original LearningSet
L
_evelO.Generalize .......(tral]"n(ex'd  ,/
Questionx
X'
Distancevectorfrom
x to itsnearestneighborpatternin L-(x,y)
Figure 4.4: Illustration of generating a level I learning
set by stacked generalization for a single
generalizer
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PredictedErrorfor q
- I ! ii
Level 1-Generalizer.
Level 1 Learning Set
L' 13'
input x, x'
outputg-y
(trained with L')
• . . ,_
I
q Question
q'
Distance v@ctorfrom q
to its nearestneighborpatternin L
Figure 4.5: Illustration of a level 1 generalizer with
a question
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Next, train the level 0 generalizer G on all of L and then
ask the generalizer a question q _ { Q - L }. q is fed into the
trained level 1 generalizer G' as a question with the vector q'
from q to its nearest neighbor in L. The answer (output) of the
level 1 generalizer is the error of the level 0 generalizer in
answering the question q.
Error prediction
A generalizer has a capability to learn a given set of
examples, and then to generalize the behavior of a parent
function or mapping. When a generalizer is asked a question that
is not in a learning set, the generalizer can provide its
answer. The error involved in the generalizer's answer can be
predicted by the stacked generalization scheme for a single
generalizer.
In Nuclear Power Plant fault diagnostics, if a transient or
accident occurs, the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser should
diagnose the transient, and provide the error bound of the ANN
diagnosis. In this thesis, stacked generalization is applied to
predict an error bound on a diagnosis performed by an ANN fault-
diagnostic adviser for a NPP. The predicted error bound of the
adviser provides the degree of reliability indicating how much
error in the diagnosis is implicated.
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CH_PTBR 5. METHOD OF 8OLUTZON
Introduotion
In this chapter, an ANN fault-diagnostic adviser for the
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (NGS) is developed. This
ANN adviser is a generalizer as defined by the criteria from
Chapter 3. This chapter describes the method used to develop an
ANN adviser that detects and classifies various operational
transients at the nuclear power plant in an accurate and timely
manner. Stacked generalization is then applied to predict
generalization errors involved in the ANN diagnoses. With
predicted errors on the diagnoses of anomalous conditions, the
plant operators can assess the accuracy of the diagnoses. The
operators can therefore compare the error-measured diagnoses of
the ANN adviser with their own determination of the plant
conditions. The operators can then incorporate the information
provided by the ANN in order to promptly rectify or mitigate the
anomalous plant conditions.
The following sections will explain the data used in this
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research, the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser and its training
process, and the error prediction method.
Data Analysed
Data
The data used for training the ANN fault-diagnostic
adviser, were obtained from San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station (NGS), owned by Southern California Edison Co. and San
Diego Gas & Electric Co [38]. San Onofre NGS is a pressurized
water reactor (PWR) plant.
The San Onofre NGS training simulator generated the data
used. These data simulate various plant operational transients
to address Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) certification
requirements for the training simulator [38]. Ten transient
scenarios (see Table 5.1) were selected among an assortment of
accident scenarios, typically used for training the operators of
San Onofre NGS. The scenarios include design-basis accidents and
less severe transients. (Note that the Stuck Open Pressurizer
Safety Valve with High Pressure Injection Inhibited is the same
type of Three-Mile Island accident) ° The data of the ten
transients obtained from the training simulator contain 33
plant-monitoring variables. These variables are listed in Table
5.2.
For each of the ten scenarios, each of the 33 plant
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Table 5.1 : List of 10 accident scenarios
with transient onset time and desired
ANN output layer activation
Scenario Transient Desired Output
Onset Time Node Activation
(sec) I 2 3 4
Turbine Trip/Reactor 6 1 0 0 0
Trip
Loss of Main Feedwater
Pumps 47 0 1 0 0
Closure of Both Main
Steam Isolation Valves 7 0 0 1 0
Trip of All Reactor Coolant
Pumps 16 0 0 0 1
Trip of A Single Reactor
Coolant Pump 14 1 1 0 0
Turbine Trip From 50% Power 50 1 0 1 0
Loss of Coolant Accident
(LOCA) With Loss of 7 1 0 0 1
Off-Site Power
Main Steam Line Break 6 0 1 1 0
Stuck Open Pressurizer Safety
with High Pressure 15 0 1 0 1
Injection Inhibited
Single Turbine Governor
Valve Closure 7 0 0 1 1
Normal Operation (before
a transient onset) --- 0 0 0 0
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Table 5.2 _ Plant variables
i) Power (flux)
2) Average Temperature (Deg F)
3) Hot Leg 1 Temperature (Deg F)
4) Cold Leg lA Temperature (Deg F)
5) Cold Leg 1B Temperature (Deg F)
6) Hot Leg 2 Temperature (Deg F)
7) Cold Leg 2A Temperature (Deg F)
8) Cold Leg 2B Temperature (Deg F)
9) Pressurizer Pressure (psia)
i0) Pressurizer Level (%)
11) Pressurizer Temperature (Deg F)
12) Steam Generator 88 Narrow Range Level (%)
13) Steam Generator 88 Water Level (%)
14) Steam Generator 88 Feed Water Flow (qpm)
15) Steam Generator 88 Feed Water Flow (Lb/sec)
16) Steam Generator 88 Steam Flow (Lb/sec)
17) Steam Generator 88 Pressure (psi)
18) Steam Generator 89 Narrow Range Level (%)
19) Steam Generator 89 Water Level (%)
20) Steam Generator 89 Feed Water Flow (gpm)
21) Steam Generator 89 Feed Water Flow (Lb/sec)
22) Steam Generator 89 Steam Flow (Lb/sec)
23) Steam Generator 89 Pressure (psi)
24) Containment Pressure (psig)
25) Containment Temperature (Deg F)
26) Pressurizer Relief Steam Flow
27) Pressurizer Relief Liquid Flow
28) Core Inlet Flow
29) Saturation Margin
30) Surge Line Temperature (Deg F)
31) Source Range Counts (cps)
32) Reactor Vessel Head Level
33) Reactor Vessel Plenum Level
- 379
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variables was collected for a total time of about ten minutes.
The 33 plant variables were collected at time step intervals of
one second. A single time step containing the 33 variables was
used to train the ANN adviser. This time snap shot of data (a
single time slice) does not constitute temporal information. The
main advantage of this approach of the single time step is
simplicity of execution and training. Thuu, the ANN adviser can
diagnose transients at very instance o_ the data presentation.
The ANN do not need to observe trends of the temporal
information of data. The simulated data contained no noise.
Each data set of a transient is divided into two parts,
normal operation data for a short time period, followed by
transient-condition data after the onset of the transient. The
transient onset times for the ten scenarios are shown in Table
5.1. Notice that with the exception of the Turbine Trip From 50%
Power, all of the transient scenarios start from the full power
normal operating conditions.
To distinguish the ten transient conditions and one normal
condition, a distinct 4-bit binary code of l's or O's for the
ANN adviser's output was used. Four output nodes were therefore
needed. Each combination of the 4-bit binary code is assigned to
a transient (see Table 5.1). Of course, 33 input nodes were
assigned to the input layer of the ANN adviser, corresponding to
the 33 plant variables.
z
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Normalization of data
Typically, ANNs require values that are scaled from 0 to 1
as inputs. However, the values of the 33 plant variables are not
in the same range. Therefore, the different ranges of the 33
plant variables should be adjusted. The adjusted values are then
fed into an input layer of the ANN adviser. This adjustment
process is accomplished in a linear fashion and is referred to
as normalization.
In order to normalize the plant variables from 0 to i, the
minimum and maximum values for each of the 33 variables were
found over the entire ten scenario data set. Then, each variable
is normalized by the following equation for an i-th plant
variable:
Xi - Xmi""i (12)Xnozmalized,i =
Xm. i X_n,i
A normalized value of 0 corresponds to the smallest meter-
reading of a plant variable. A normalized value of i corresponds
to the maximum meter-reading. A FORTRAN code called "NORMAL" was
written to normalize the data (refer to Appendix B). The
normalized data for each transient scenario constitute the
recall set for the transient. The recall set will be used to
observe the generalization accuracy of a trained ANN adviser
later in this thesis.
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Development of an kWN Fault-Diagnostic Adviser
As illustrated in Chapter 3, the backpropagation ANN
paradigm is one of algorithms that satisfies the generalizer
criteria [36] [37 ]. The backpropagation ANN paradigm is
therefore employed here to develop the ANN fault-diagnostic
adviser for the San Onofre NGS.
Learn_Dq set and learninu process of the ANN adviser
In order for the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser to function
well for the San Onofre NGS, the ANN adviser must learn how to
classify the ten transients. This is accomplished by training
the ANN adviser on a given learning set (or training set) of
data. The ANN adviser will then generalize the smaller training
data set to the lager recall set.
One might try to expand the learning set to as large as
possible in an effort to accomplish higher generalization
efficacy. However, superfluous learning examples require more
computation time which is expensive. Thus, it is important to
choose a training data set that represents the necessary
characteristics of the transients of interest and simplifies the
training process as much as possible.
Additionally, the optimization of the number of inputs (or
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the proper selection of plant variables) is considered in a
learning [12] [17]. Such optimization of the input node number
will contribute to establishing a simpler ANN architecture and
to achieving a faster learning. This architecture optimization
is however not the topic of this thesis and will not be
discussed further.
Selection of level 0 lea_ninq set As a first step, a
total of 20 input-output patterns was chosen as an initial
learning set. Two patterns from each transient, one input-output
pattern of normal operation at one second, and another input-
output pattern (post-accident pattern) for the stabilized
transient condition at the end time (when data collection had
ceased), were included in the initial learning set.
The next step is the selection of an appropriate
architecture of the ANN adviser. The architecture selection was
performed on a trial-and-error basis. In this work, an
architecture of 53-22-10-4 was chosen after investigating many
others. Thus, the ANN adviser has 33 nodes in the input layer,
22 nodes in the first hidden layer, i0 nodes in the second
hidden layer, and 4 nodes in the output layer. The ANN adviser
begins the learning process with initial weights whose values
are randomly assigned.
The ANN adviser is trained until it achieves a
predetermined value of learning accuracy (error). The learning
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error is expressed as a root-mean-square (RMS). The RMS error,
for all presented patterns that were used during the learning
process, is calculated in accordance with Eq. 13, below [4].
112RMS = ( tg,_ - o_,I)2 (13)
where tj.i is the desired output and _.i is the ANN output of the
j-th output node for the i-th training pattern. The k in the
above equation is the total number of patterns in the learning
set, and n is the total number of output nodes. Sometimes, in
other contexts, the learning error is referred to as the cost
function. Later, in this thesis, the RMS error is interpreted as
an actual diagnostic error when the ANN adviser is presented a
novel input condition of a NPP operational transient.
The training process of the adviser on the initial learning
set was continued until a target learning error (RMS error) of
0.01 was obtained. After obtaining the target learning error,
the next step is adding new patterns to the original learning
set. This process is illustrated as follows.
The trained ANN adviser is recalled each of the ten
normalized recall sets. For each recall set, an RMS error at
each single time step data is calculated, and is plotted versus
time. In the RMS error versus time plot for each scenario,
several peaks of large RMS values are typically observed. These
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peaks indicate that the ANN adviser doesn't learn enough to show
generalization characteristic at those data points. The peak
usually arises when a presented pattern at the peak has distinct
or unusual features that are not contained in the initial
learning set. Of course, the initial learning set of the 20
examples contains insufficient information to instruct the
adviser to perform the correct classification.
Hence, the unfamiliar patterns exhibiting the peaks on the
RMS error plot are added to the initial learning set. The
expanded learning set will furnish the adviser more information
adequate to performing a correct classification.
With the expanded learning set, the learning process is
repeated. When the target learning error is attained once again,
the RMS versus time plots are re-drawn. Then the patterns
corresponding to the error peaks on the plots are added to the
learning set. The above procedures are repeated until such peaks
do not appear on the RMS versus time plots. The training,
recalling, and expanding of the learning set, was iterated so
that all peaks fell below 0.i or less of the RMS error except
for those peaks very close (in time) to the failure which
initiates the transient. Typical plots are Figure 6.1 through
6.10 on page 61 through 65.
The ANN adviser For the San Onofre scenarios of ten
transients, a total of 113 training input-output patterns was
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obtained by the above procedure. Note that this learning set
includes ten different initial conditions due to a different
initial power flux level. The remaining 103 input-output
patterns correspond to abnormal conditions at the NPP. The
finalized learning set of 113 patterns, which is designated as
set L, is displayed in Appendix B. Consequently, this finalized
learning set L is the level 0 learning set which is used to
train the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser.
Hence, .the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser for the San Onofre
NGS (a level 0 generalizer) was developed by training on the
finalized learning set L (the level 0 learning set). The ANN
fault-diagnostic adviser was then recalled on data which the
adviser was not trained, in order to examine the adviser's
responses to novel input conditions. Results will be shown in
Figure 6.1 through Figure 6.10 on page 61 through 65 of the next
chapter.
EZzor Prediction in the ANN Pauli Diagnostics for l_ NPP
In order to validate results of the ANN fault-diagnostic
adviser, errors bounds on the ANN diagnoses should be given. In
this thesis, the error prediction is performed by applying
stacked generalization for a single generalizer to the ANN
adviser developed in the preceding sections. How the stacked
generalization is applied to this research will be illustrated
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in the following sections.
Generatinq a level i learninq set
In the above sections the ANN adviser was trained on the
level 0 learning set L. The level 0 learning set L with k = 113
input-output patterns constitutes information space of level 0.
Using the CVPS, r = k = 113 partitions were created such
that O_ = an input-output pattern of (x,y) and 0ii = { L -
(x,y) } containing 112 patterns, for a partition i, where 1 S i
r, and i is an integer, x is an input pattern of the 33 plant
variables, and y is the desired output pattern assigned the 4-
bit binary code. Note that x and y are vectors in multi-
dimensional vector space.
The next step is to generate the level 1 learning set to be
used for the error prediction of the developed ANN adviser. In
order to generate the level 1 learning set, another
backpropagation ANN having the same architecture of the
developed ANN adviser was used as a level 0 generalizer.
For each partition, the level 0 backpropagation ANN was
trained on Oii (until it obtained the same target learning error
of 0.01 as that of ANN adviser), and then presented an input
pattern x of Ou, as a question. The error 8 of the generalizer
for the question was computed by subtracting the generalizer
output from the desired output, as follows:
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(14)
where _ is an value of the j-rh output node of the generalizer,
and _ is a j-th component of the desired output y corresponding
to the question x. The next step is to calculate vector x' from
x to its nearest neighbor vector x_.
First, nearest neighbor vector _. from x was chosen in the
8il= { L - (x,y) } such that x_ has the smallest distance
J Km - x I- And the vector x' from x to its nearest neighbor _
can be determined by a vector equation x' = Km - z. However,
some components of the vector x' calculated by the equation, may
have negative values that are not appropriate as an input to an
ANN. Therefore, a transformation was applied to constrain all
components of x' positive without loss of any information
content by imposing a transformation. The transformation used
here is expressed as
= [ . 1] (is)2
for i-rh component of the vector. Additionally, this
transformation formula also insure that all components are
within the interval [0,i].
The procedures outlined above, were repeated for all other
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partitions. Now, for the 113 partitions, a total of 113 trios of
x, x' and 8 were acquired Therefore, the level 1 learning set
L' consisted of these 113 trios. Note that x and x' constitutes
a new input pattern which has been expanded into R 33+33space of
the new learning set L'. And e _ R 4 constitutes a desired output
pattern in L'. These new input-output patterns in L' were used
to train the level 1 generalizer to predict errors on the
results of the level 0 generalizer.
Traininq of a level 1 qeneralizer
The next step is to train a level 1 generalizer on the
level 1 learning set L'. The level 1 generalizer that learned
the associations between level 0 generalization and its related
error, will predict the error bounds on the level 0 generalizer.
The level 1 generalizer was chosen to be another backpropagation
neuralnetwork.
Since the level 1 information space is expanded from R 33
into R_, the number of input nodes of the level i generalizer
should be extended into 66 nodes. The architecture of the level
1 generalizer was selected to be 66-30-20-10-4. This
architecture was schosen after several attempts were made to
attain a suitable architecture. The level 1 generalizer was
trained on the level I learning set L' until a target learning
error (RMS) of 0.01 was reached.
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_redic_ed Error
The developed ANN adviser will categorize (classify) the
novel input-conditions at the plant into a normal condition or
a specific transient (or accident). This classification is the
diagnosis of the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser, for an unknown
symptom in the plant operational status. For the diagnosis, the
developed level 1 generalizer will provide an error bound on the
diagnosis. The novel input-condition that is fed into the ANN
fault-diagnostic adviser (level 0), plus the vector from the
input-condition (pattern) to its nearest pattern, are presented
as an input condition to the level 1 generalizer. For the level
1 input condition, the level 1 generalizer will predict the
error on the diagnosis of the level 0 ANN adviser. For the ten
transients, the predicted error bounds on the ANN adviser's
diagnoses are shown in Figure 6.11 through Figure 6.30 in the
next chapter.
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CIL_PTBK 6. RESULT8 OF THE RESEARCH
Diagnostic Results of the &dvisez
The ANN fault-diagnostic adviser for the San Onofre NGS was
trained on the level 0 learning set consisting of 113 example
patterns. The number of the examples in the level 0 learning set
was about 2% out of the 6203 patterns of the entire recall sets.
Each of the ten recall sets was then used in the recall process
of the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser. Results shows that the ANN
faut-diagnostic adviser classified the plant input conditions
correctly.
Table 6.1 shows the results of the ANN adviser
classifications. The first column shows the transients onset
times. The second column shows the time needed for the adviser
to make a diagnosis with the actual diagnostic RMS error of
below 0.1. The ANN adviser classifies most of the abnormal
conditions correctly within 30 seconds after transient onset,
and even imme_iately in the case of the Stuck Open Pressurizer
Safety with High Pressure Injection Inhibited. One exception is
391
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Table 6.1 : Summary of the ANN adviser results
Scenario Transient Time, after the
Onset Time onset, needed to
(sec) diagnose thetransient
Turbine Trip/Reactor 6 30
Trip
Loss of Main Feedwater
Pumps 47 3
Closure of Both Main
Steam Isolation Valves 7 28
Trip of All __eactor
Coolant Pumps 16 2
Trip of a Single Reactor
Coolant Pump 14 62
Turbine Trip From 50% Power 50 1
Loss of Coolant Accident
(LOCA) with Loss of 7 14
Off-Site Power
Main Steam Line Break 6 4
Stuck Open Pressurizer Safety
with High Pressure 15 Immediate diagnose
Injection Inhibited
Single Turbine Governor
Valve Closure 7 16
the Trip of A Single Reactor Coolant Pump for which the correct
classification takes about 62 seconds. This transient is
characteristically similar to the Trip of A/I Reactor Coolant
Pumps. It is understandable that the adviser may need more time
392
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to distinguish that transient from this similar one. Note that
the diagnosing time of the Trip of A/I Reactor Coolant Pumps
after the onset is only 2 seconds.
Figure 6.1 through Figure 6.10 show the typical recall
performance of the trained ANN adviser for the ten transients.
The ordinate value of the figures is the diagnostic RMS error
for the ANN output versus time. The diagnostic RMS error is
interpreted as an actual error as compared with the true
solution involved in the ANN diagnosis. As seen in these
figures, the adviser responds very quickly to the onset of the
transients. However, since the plant input variables are,
dynamically and suddenly, changing during a short transitory
period after the onset, the adviser diagnoses are inconclusive
or incorrect for this period. This transitory period for each
transient is shown in the figures as well as in the second
column of Table 6.1. After the transitory period passes, the ANN
adviser diagnoses the plant transients correctly.
Error Prediction on the Adviser Diagnosis
The error prediction on diagnoses of the ANN fault-
diagnostic adviser was performed by applying stacked
generalization to the adviser. The results of the error
prediction are shown in the odd numbered figures 6.11 through
6.30. For each transient scenario, there is an even and odd
_
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Figure 6.4 : Recall performance for the transient of
Trip of All Reactor Coolant Pumps
395
63
0.6
Trip of A Single Reactor Coolant Pump
0.5 -
L_O
'- 0.4 -i._
O9
0.3 -
o
(m .... . .
_ 0.2-
,mQ
0,1 - ,
t
I.
, _ 5_ ,o_ _Sl 2o_2s_3o__ 4o_ sol _ eo_
Time(s)
Figure 6.5 : Recall performance for the transient of
Trip of a Single Reactor Coolant Pump
0.6
- • -.. • TurbineTrip h=om50% Power ,i
0.5-
0.4 -
III
:E
0.3-
.0
_ 0.2
_5
0.1
, , , , ", _ , , , I'
1 51 101 151 _1 _1 _1 _1 _1 _1 _1 _1 _1w_1
_mo (_
Figure 6.6 : Recall performance for the transient of
Turbine Trip From 50% Power
1
396
_
64
0.6
Loss of Coolant Accident
With Loss of Off-Site Power0.5
0
i 51 1011512012sI301_i 4014siso1ssl601
Time (s)
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numbered pair of figures.
For the Turbine Trip and Reactor Trip, Figure 6.11 shows
the predicted errors on the diagnoses of the ANN adviser given
from the stacked generalization technique. Figure 6.12 displays
the classification of the diagnosis that resulted from the
combination of the predicted errors with the diagnoses of the
ANN adviser. This error-combined Classification will be provided
as a final result to the operators at the NPP since the true
solution will be unknown. Note that when a predicted error fall
below 0.05, the diagnosis is considered to be acceptable or
reliable.
In Figure 6.15, the predicted errors indicate the estimated
uncertainty in the ANN adviser diagnoses. During the transitory
period (in this case, from 7 seconds through 28 seconds), the
predicted errors are so large that the diagnosis for this
transitory period is unreliable. Hence, the classification is
undetermined for the transitory period as seen in Figure 6.16.
Since the diagnoses are undetermined, the plant operators should
keep monitoring the plant for further anomalous conditions. The
operators must wait for a more certain diagnosis from the ANN
adviser. After the transitory period passes, the predicted
errors are less than 0.05. The diagnosis of the adviser is then
reliable and Figure 6.16 shows that the classification is the
Closure of Both Main Steam Isolation Valves. Thus, the operators
perceive diagnosis, and then take their responses to the
399
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Figure 6.16 : Classification of the diagnosis for the
Closure of Both Main Steam Isolation Valves
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Figure 6.18 : Classification of the diagnosis for the Trip
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Figure 6.24 : Classification of the diagnosis for the Loss
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anomaly.
Another fascinating example is the Turbine Trip From 50%
Power displayed in Figure 6.21 and 6.22. Figure 6.21 shows that
the predicted errors on the diagnoses are significantly large
for this entire scenario, even over the normal operation period.
This indicates that the diagnoses are unreliable for the entire
time period. In contrast with this figure, Figure 6.6 shows that
the diagnoses are correct for the entire period. This
discrepancy looks like an unwanted result of the method used in
this research. But it justifies the method. Notice that all the
data for the other transients were collected from 100% power,
except for this particular transient where the data were
collected from 50% power. Consequently, from the viewpoint of
generalization accuracy as measured by stacked generalization,
the adviser was not able to sufficiently generalize this
specific scenario of the Turbine Trip From 50% Power. In other
words, the confidence on the diagnoses for this transient cannot
help being very low. The assuredness on the diagnoses of this
transient can be increased by training the ANN adviser with more
transients from this lower reactor power level. This additional
training will increase the generalization accuracy for this kind
of different power transients. The implication of the above
result can be applied as follows.
As seen in the figures of the diagnostic RMS error (Figure
6.1 through Figure 6oi0), a recall performance is measured by
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calculating the RMS error. The recall performance is typically
used to check the generalization accuracy within a single
transient. Hence, the generalization accuracy of the ANN
diagnoses within a single specific transient is obtained from
the recall performance. However, this generalization accuracy
within a single transient cannot provide the generalization
accuracy for a unique transient scenario being compared with
other transient scenarios. For example, the result in Figure 6.6
could not anticipate the result in Figure 6.21. Hence, the
generalization accuracy for a unique transient scenario being
compared with other transient scenarios can only be obtained by
applying the stacked generalization error prediction method. In
other words, the generalization accuracy for the entire scenario
is obtained by applying the error prediction method that was
investigated in this thesis. For instance, the result in Figure
6.21 indicates that the transient of the Turbine Trip From 50%
Power needs more training data in order to be generalized from
the other transients.
Another illustrative example is shown Figure 6.10 and 6.29.
The predicted errors in the case of the Single Turbine Governor
Valve Closure in Figure 6.29 are very low for the entire period.
But the actual diagnostic RMS error in Figure 6.10 shows that
the diagnosis for the transitory period (from 7 seconds to 21
seconds) is not correct. Hence, this inconsistency means that
the predicted error for this particular transient during this
= 411
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transitory period is not appropriate. This is probably due to
incomplete training of the level i generalizer. This difficulty
should be investigated further as future work.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUBION8
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate a validation
technique that provides an estimated error for the diagnosis of
an ANN fault-diagnostic adviser for a NPP. To this end, an ANN
adviser was successfully developed to detect and classify ten
transient scenarios and ten normal conditions in a PWR nuclear
power plant. The error prediction was accomplished by applying
stacked generalization error analysis to the ANN adviser. The
results demonstrate the feasibility of the error prediction
method for a nuclear power plant status diagnostics.
If an anomaly occurs, the ANN fault-diagnostic adviser
detects and diagnoses the anomaly incipiently. For the diagnosis
by the adviser, a predicted error allows the plant operators to
obtain an idea of the validity of the diagnosis from the ANN
adviser. The operators can act in a timely manner to mitigate or
rectify the problems associate with the particular transient at
hand once the diagnosis is assured by a low predicted error.
Additionally, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, error
prediction by stacked generalization can tell us the
413
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generalization accuracy not only for a single transient, but
also for each individual transient scenario as compared with all
the other scenarios.
Possible Futuzi Wozk
Further refinement of the stacked generalization technique
would be the first step, because many aspects of the technique
are black art, as Wolpert describes in his paper [41]. Moreover,
the technique should be modified so that it may be implemented
to solve enormously complex problems, such as an error
prediction for 300 NPP transients.
As seen in Figure 6.10 and 6.29, the predicted errors in
Figure 6.29 are low for the entire period although the actual
diagnostic error in Figure 6.10 is high during the transitory
period. This is probably associated with incomplete training of
the level 1 generalizer. Hence, this difficulty should be
investigated further as future work.
Fundamentally, the stacked generalization utilizes
nonparametric-statistical information in a learning set.
Accordingly, each example in a learning set is closely related
to generalization accuracy, i.e., the more appropriate selection
of examples, the better the generalization. Hence, for the
optimized selection of learning examples from data, it is
suggested that the stacked generalization may be applied as a
414
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more suitable method for the selection of examples for the
learning set.
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7 Glossary of Terms
Accidents: A severe instabifity in nuclear power plant conditions that might
include injury of the personnel, damage of hardware or a release of radioactive
materials.
Activation or transfer function: Usually a nonlinear function used in nodes in
ANNs that perform computations° The input to the function is the weighted sum of
all nodes' inputs. The network passes the output of the function to other nodes or
to the outside environment as an output of the network. Examples of these
functions are the sigmoidal, the hard limiter, the identity function.
Artificial neural network (ANN)" A computing system made up of simple,
highly interconnected processing elements which process information.
Artificial neural network architecture: The number of layers and nodes, and
the way these nodes are interconnected via weights.
Convergence of weights: The modification of weights during training in order to
find a final stable set of values that will give the desired outputs. Backpropagation
training algorithm employs this type of convergence.
Generalization: The ability of the network to classify a given novel input based on
its relation with known stored knowledge.
Generalizer: A mathematical algorithm that can infer a parent function from
given examples (training set). An ANN is one example of a generalizer.
Hidden layer: A set of hidden nodes.
Hidden nodes: Computational elements that do not directly receive data, or send
data to, the ANNs external environment.
Input nodes: Elements that receive information from the external environment.
Typically they perform no computations.
Learning (training or teaching the network): A mathematical rule for
adjusting the interneuron connection weights in order to optimize the ANN
performance.
Mapping by a network: Finding the set(s) of weights that will relate a set of
inputs with a set of desired outputs.
Nodes (processing or computational elements): The computational elements
that make up an ANN. In their typical form they sum their weighted inputs and
pass the result through a nonlinearity function.
Output nodes: Computational elements that are capable of sending signals to the
network's external environment.
Recall set: A set of patterns which the trained network is used to classify.
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RMS error: The root mean square of the differences of the actual and the desired
outputs of the network.
Similar transients: Transients at nuclear power plants that cause groups of the
measuring instruments to show similar responses for different instabilities.
Stacked generalization: A technique that can predict the error in the output of a
single generalizer.
Supervised learning: Learning that uses information available outside the
network to make adjustments in weights, number of times the data is presented, and
when to terminate the learning process.
Training algorithm: A mathematical rule for adjusting the interneuron
connection weights in order to optimize the ANN performance by providing
convergence of weights.
Training patterns' A set the values of the networks inputs and their associated
outputs.
Training set: A set of input patterns and their corresponding outputs.
Transient: A severe deviation from the normal operating conditions of nuclear
power plants.
Unsupervised learning or self organization: A process that relies only on
information available in _he input patterns to modify the parameters of the network.
Unlike the supervised learning, the outputs in the unsupervised learning scheme are
not supplied to the network.
Weights: The interconnections between the nodes of the network. Weights can be
real, integers, and complex numbers.
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8 ISU/DAEC Plant Trip Log Book
This section is a copy of the daily records of the trips made by the project members
to the Duane Arnold energy center
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : April 1991 at ISU
Depart ISU : In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 1. Don Vest from DAEC
Depart DAEC :
Arrive ISU :
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Discussions were held between Don Vest from DAEC and students
and faculty of the nuclear engineering program. Topics covered
were pla_t process variables, and transient selection. The
discussions lasted for about two and a half hours.
Present at the meeting were (from ISU):
Dr. E.B. Bartlett
Dr. R.A. Danofsky
John Adams
Anujit Basu
Serhat Alien
Terry Lanc
Keehoon Kim
The list of plant variables and the list of operational trans-
ients were reviewed. A tentative selection was made of the
important variables and transients. A brief outline was presented
about the capabilities and restrictions of the operator training
simulator at the DAEC training facility.
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : May 11, 1991.
Depart ISU : 11:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 1:30 PM I. Dr. R.A.Danofsky (iSU)
Depart DAEC : 6:00 PM 2. Dr. E.B.Bartlett (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 9:00 PM 3. Serhat Alien (ISU)
4. Terry Lanc (ISU)
5. Don Vest (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Discussions were held with Don Vest and plant personnel. Topics
covered included logistics and data collection strategies. A
tour of the training facility and the simulator was also carried
out.
This trip was mainly intended to establish contact with the
personnel at the DAEC operator training center.
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LOG BOOK
Date : June 03, 1991
Depart ISU : 2:30 PM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 4:30 PM 1. Dr.E.B.Bartlett (ISU)
Depart DAEC : i!:00 PM 2. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 1:00 AM (June 04) 3. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
4. Keehoon Kim (ISU)
5. Don Vest (DAEC)
6. Crai_ Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS •
Discussions were held with Don Vest and Craig Hunt of DAEC on
plant process _ariables to be monitored during simulation for
transient, of general interest. A list of 83 variables were
chosen and put in a control file for trending during simulation.
Transient Simulated : RRISA
Recirculation loop 'A' rupture
(Design-basis LOCA, 100_, double ended shear - loop A)
Length of simulation : 5 minutes
File Name : RR15A.DAT
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : July 20, 1991
Depart ISU : 7:30 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 10:45 AM I. Dr.E.B.Bartlett (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 7:00 PM 2. Terry Lane (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 9:00 PM 3. Anujit Basu (ISU)
4. Keehoon Kim (ISU)
5. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
6. John Kerr (ISU)
7. Don Vest (DAEC)
8. Craig Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Further discussions were held with Don Vest and Craig Hunt on
plant process variables to be monitored for transients of
general interest. The 83 variables list from the previous trip
was expanded to 97 variables. Two variables from the previous
list, which were judged to be unimportant, were dropped. The
new list also contained, a boolean transient true-false switch
which indicated the onset of the transient.
Transients Simulated : MS14 and FW17
MS14 • Loss of feedwater heating to both feedwater heaters
6A and 6B.
This transient is caused due to loss of extraction
steam.
Initial condition is IC24, IOOY,power, Middle of Fuel
Cycle (MOC).
Run Time : 5 rain46 sec including 17 sec of normal data
File name : MS14_6.DAT
FW17 : Main feedwater line break inside primary containment.
100_,break in feedwater line 'A'.
Initial condition is IC24, IOOY,power, MOC.
Run Time : 5 min 16 sec including 11 sec of normal data
, File name • FW17A.DAT
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LOG BOOK
Date : August 31, 1991
Depart ISU : 7:15 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 10:30 AM 1. Dr.E.B.Bartlett (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 4:30 PM 2. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 6:30 PM 3. Terry Lanc (ISU)
4. Don Vest (DAEC)
5. Craig Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Discussions were continued with Don Vest and Craig Hunt as to
transients to be simulated and variables to be monitored. The
97 variables list was expanded to 98 variables; in the process
some old variables were dropped and some new ones added.
Transients Simulated : MC01 and FW02
MC01 : Main circulation water pump 'A' trip.
Initial condition IC24, lO0_,power, MOC.
Run Time : 9 rain 46 sec including 6 sec of normal data.
File name : MCOIA.DAT
FW02 : Condensate pump 'A' trip.
Initial condition IC24, 100_ po,er, MOC.
Run time : 12 rain 44 sec including 6 sec of normal data.
File name : FWO2A.DAT
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LOG BOOK
Date : September 14, 1991
Depart ISU : 7:15 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 10:15 AM 1. Dr.E.B.Bartlett (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 4:15 PM 2. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 6:15 PM S. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
4. Terry Lanc (ISU)
5. Don Vest (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Discussions were held with Don Vest on ATWS and variables being
monitored. In view of the particular transients to be simulated
this day, two more booleans were added, making 100 variables. The
software on the simulator at the DAEC facility currently has the
capability to trend only 100 variables during a simulation.
Transients Simulated : RP05
The first transient simulated was the main turbine trip
together with failure to scram and failure of alternate rod
injection (ARI). No operator action was involved. Initial
condition was IC24, 1007.power, MOC. The actual plant, as well
as the simulator, would have automatically scrammed after the
initiation of this transient failing which, ARI would initiate,
safely shutting down the reactor. The two booleans introduced
were the used to supress both of these safety features by
holding their values at 0.0.
File name : RPSACTCl.DAT
The second transient simulated was also the main turbine trip
together with failure to scram. But in this case ARI does occur.
No operator action was involved. Initial condition was IC24,
1007.power, MOC. The ARI resulted in a slow scram. As the ARI
did not need to be over-ridden at this time, the corresponding
boolean was removed, and so only 99 variables were used in this
simulation.
File name : RPOSTCO1.DAT
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Date : September 28, 1991
Depart ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : I0:00 AM 1. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 3:00 PM 2. Terry Lanc (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 5:00 PM 3. Don Vest (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Discussions were held with Don Vest on various initial condi-
tions. The proposed adviser will be able to detect both normal
and abnormal conditions. So it is important to collect data
concerning various normal conditions too. It was decided to
simulate all the standard initial cond/tions available on the
simulator, and to follow each simulation by a spurious scram.
An attempt was made to simulate a condition, but the system was
inoperative. No data was obtained on this trip.
Photographs were taken for publicity of the project. An instruc-
tional tour of the simulator complex was undertaken.
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : October 12, 1991
Depam% ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 9:45 AM 1. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 5:00 PM 2. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 7:00 PM 3. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
4. Don Vest (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Two initial conditions were simulated with spurious scram.
IC22 : This is 25_ Power, Beginning of Cycle (BOC)
98 variables trended.
File name : IC22SCRA.DAT
IC14 : This is 100_ Power, Beginning o5 Cycle (BOC)
98 variables trended.
File name : IC14SCRA.DAT
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Date : October 26, 1991
Depart ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : I0:00 AM I. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 4:00 PM 2. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 6:00 PM 3. Keehoon Kim (ISU)
4. Don Vest (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Further initial conditions with spurious scrams were simulated.
IC23 : This is 75X Power, Beginning of Cycle (BOC)
98 variables trended.
File name : IC23SCRA.DAT
lC20 : This is 100_, Power, End o_ Cycle (EOC)
98 variables trended.
File name : IC20SCRA.DAT
IC24 : This is I00_ Power, Middle of Cycle (MOC)
98 variables trended.
File name : IC24SCRA.DAT
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : November 16, 1991
Depart ISU : 7:05 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : I0:00 AM I. Dr.E.B.Bartlett (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 5:30 PM 2. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 7:30 PM 3. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
4. Terry Lanc (ISU)
5_ Don Vest (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Transients Simulated : HP05 and HP08
HP05 : High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break
in HPCI room. 100% severity. Initial condition IC20,
100% power, EOC.
File name : IC20HPO5.DAT
HP08 : HPCI steam line break in Torus room. 100% severity.
Initial condition IC20, 100% power, EOC.
File name : IC20HPOS.DAT
Discussions were held with Don Vest about anticipated operator
action. Ali previous accidents did not have any operator ection.
But during a prolonged transient in a real plant, the operator
will be taking preventive and/or corrective action. The proposed
adviser should be able to recognize the transient in spite o_ such
interventions by the operators. For this reason, it was decided to
simulate some transients with operator action.
Transients Simulated : RP03
RP03 : Spurious scram with operator action. Initial condition
IC20, 100_ power, EOC. The operators were not able to
successfully control the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
levels which led to the trip of feed pumps.
File name : IC20SCR1.DAT
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RP03 : Spurious scram with operator ac%ion. Initial condition
IC20, I00_ power, EOC. This time the operators were able
to successfully control the RPV levels to prevent trip
of feed pumps.
File name : IC20SCR2.DAT
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : December 14, 1991
Depart ISU : 7:05 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 10:10 AM i. Dr.E.B.Bartlett (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 5:20 AM 2. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 7:30 AM 3. Terry Lane (ISU)
4. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
5. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
6. Don Vest (DAEC)
7. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Discussions were held with Don Vest and Dan Berchenbriter on agenda
for the next several months.
Transients Simulated : CUIO
CUIO : Loss of reactor clean-up water (coolant). Accident is
caused by reactor water clean-up line break outside
primary containment. Initial condition IC24, IOOY, power,
MOC. Decay heat is normal. Mo operator action is involved.
Initially, the reactor water level goes down and valve on
the reactor water clean-up line closes. There is a high
differential temperature, and group 5 isolation occurs. The
reactor water level drops to 180 inches and then rises back
to 190 inches. The plant recovers. Reactor building high
radiation alarm sounds. Accident recovery duration is
approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
File Name : CUIO.DAT
Talked about schedule. The next trip was planned on Jan. 18, 1992.
Went on a trip thzough the plant. Visited the reactor building, the
turbine building, the spent fuel storage pool area and the control
room. The plan_ was being prepared for a refueling outage o
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : December 15, 1991
Depart ISU : --- In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : --- 1. Don Vest (DAEC)
Depart DAEC : --- 2. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
Arrive ISU : ---
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
The previous accident, loss of reactor clean-up water (CUIO), was
repeated. This time, failure of group 5 isolation valves was added
to the scenario. This .ork was performed without an ISU cre.
present, and the data .as sent over.
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LO0 BOOK
Date : January 18, 1992
Depart ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 9:45 AM 1. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 4:20 PM 2. Terry Lane (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 6:30 PM 3. Chalapathy Dhan, ada (ISU)
4. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
5. Criag Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Discussions wore held about the transients to be simulated. The
trend file ,as modified a bit and new containe_ 100 variables.
Transients Simulated : FW18 and MS19
FW18 : Main foed, ater line A break outside primary containment in
the ground floor of turbine building. Thick 360 crack
on 16" line, single-ended shear break. Two phase floe
limits loss. There is loss of pressure in the common line
behind the feedwater pumps. This cause the feedwater
pumps to trip.
File Name : FW18A.DAT
MSI9 : Group i isolatiou caused by failure of relays. The valves
fail closed on both legs A _ B. Leg A alone ,ould have
resulted in only an alarm sounding. Reactor vessel level
drops. Relief valve allows yes,el to blog doun to torus.
File Name : MS19.DAT
RR30 : This transient gas simulated but data gas not collected
duo to hardware problems. See log from the next trip for
a description of the transient.
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : February 1, 1992
Depart ISU : 6:55 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 9:15 AM 1 Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 3:45 PM 2 Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 5:%5 PM 3 Rodney Schuler (ISU)
% Taher Aljundi (ISU)
5 Dan Birchenbriter (DAEC)
6 Cria_ Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Transients Simulated : RR30, MS03, MSO%, and FW09
RR30 : Coolant leakage inside primary containment. The simulation
was a 100_ double ended shear in a 2" diameter pipe. This
transient is caused by weld failure in the reactor vessel
bottom drain pipe. Initial condition IC24, 100_ power, MOC.
File Name : RR30.DAT
MS03 : Main steam line (MSL) rupture inside primary containment.
Steam line A was selected for the simulation. The break
was of I00_ severity, i.e. a double-ended shear in the
20" diameter steam line. This transient is caused by
piping failure or flow restriction at the high pressure
instrument tap that feed control room monitor steam flow
instrumentation. Initial cond/tion IC2%, I00_ power MOC.
File Name : MSO3A.DAT
MSO% : This transient is the same as MS03 except that it is
caused by piping failure at main steam common header.
This results in a rupture outside the primary containment
at the tube inlet header.
File Name : MSO4A.DAT
FW09 : Reactor feedwater pump trip. The simulation was a trip of
pump A. This transient is caused by a spurious trip siEnal.
Initial condition IC24, 100_ power, MOC. This malfunction
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causes the selected main feedwater puanpto trip in standby
due to a spurious trip signal. The pump motor breaker will
trip open and annunciation will activate. The pump pressure
and flow will decrease and the recirculation valve, if
open, will close.
File Name : FWI9A.DAT
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : Febr_,ary 15, 1992
Depart ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : I0:00 _M 1. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 2:30 PM 2. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
Ar;'ive ISU : 4:30 PM 3. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
4. Criag Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Transients Simulat4_ : HS02, FW12, and MS32
HS02 : Steam leak :_nside primary containment. This transient is
caused by main steam leak at RCIC line elboe. I_itial
condition IC24, I007, power, MOC. Main steam flow will
increas_ a_c reactor pressure will decrease• High drye.ell
" pressure at 2 PSIG eil! trip the reactor.
File Name : _;502A.DAT
FWI2 : Feedwater regulator valve controller failure. This transi-
ent is caused by the failure of the controller of the
feedwater r_=_ulator valve, causing thu valve to be stuck
at a particular position. Two simulations eere carried
out, one for the valve s_uck fully open and the other for
the valve stuck fully closed. Both simulations had initial
conditions IC_4, I007, power, MOC.
(a) High : This is the scenario ,hen the valve is stuck
open all the way.
_ile Name : FWI2H.DAT
(b) Low : This is the scenario when the valve is stuck
in the fully closed position.
File Name ,.FW12L.DAT
MS32 : Spurious group 7 isolation. Short circuit causes relay
CR4841 to rip close. Closure will cause the _ryeell to
energize. This causes the group 7 isolation
valve to trip close. Closure will cause the dryeell to
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loose cooling; drywell temperature and pressure will
increase. At 2 PSIG drywell pressure, the reactor will
scram, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) will be
initiated,and group 2,3,4, and 5 isolation will be
initiated. Initial condition IC24, 1007,power, MOC.
File Name : MS32.DAT
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date :February 29, 1992
Depart ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 9:20 AM 1. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 2:05 PM 2. Tahe_" Aljundi (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 4:15 PM 3. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
4. Criag Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Transients Simulated : RX01, RRIO, TC02, and FW04
RX01 : Fuel cladding failure. Simulation .as for 1007. severity
.hich -as 307. fuel clad damage. As the damage increases,
the amount of activity in the reactor recirculation loop
and the main steam system .ill increase. This activity
.ill propagate throughout the plant and the radiation
monitoring system-ill indicate the same. At 1007. severity,
the main steam line radiation monitors .ill cause main
steam isolation and reactor scram at set point. Initial
condition IC24, 1007. po.or, MOC.
File Name : RXO1.DAT
RRIO : Recirculation pump speed feedback signal failure. For the
simulation, 1007. of the feedback signal to pump A .as lost.
This caused fluctuations in the steam flo. and po.or
generated. Initial condition IC24, 100_. po.or, MOC.
File Name : RRIOA.DAT
TC02 : Emergency Hydraulic Cooiing (EHC) system hydraulic pump
trip. Both pumps A % B .ore made to trip in the simulation.
The EHC pumps fail and trip on overload. Turbine trip
follo.s as the EHC system pressure reaches 1300 PSIG.
Initial condition IC24, 1007. po.or, MOC.
File Name : TCO2.DAT
FW04 : Condensate filter domin resin injection. At 1007. severity,
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(a) The transient was simulated at 60_. severity.
File Name : FWI7A_2.DAT
(b) The transient was simulated at 30_ severity.
File Name • FW17A_S.DAT
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Date :April 25, 1992
, Depart ISU : 7:20 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : lO:lO AM I. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 2:15 PM 2. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 4:15 PM 3. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
4. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
5. Criag Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Further simulation were carried out for previously simulated
transients but at different severities.
Transients Simulated : HP05 and HP08
HP05 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
November 16, 1991. Initial condition IC20, 1007.power,
EOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at 607. severity.
File Name : HPOS_2.DAT
(b) The transient was simulated at 307. severity.
File game : HPO5_3.DAT
HP08 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
November 16, 1991. Initial condition IC20, 100% power,
EOC.
(a) The transient was simltlatedat 607.severity.
File Name : HPOS_2.DAT
(b) The transient was simulated at 30% severity.
File Name : HPO8_3.DAT
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Date ' March 14, 1992
Depart ISU ' 7:10 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC • 9:40 AM I. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC ' 2:20 PM 2. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
Arrive ISU ' 4:30 PM 3. Rodney Schuler (ISU)
4. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
5. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS •
Talked to Dan Berchenbriter about present variables being monitored
and addition to that list in the near future. Also talked about
"similar" accidents. Reviewed goals and progress to date.
The simulator was down for upsradation. Took an educational tour of
the plant. The plant was down for a refueling outage at the time.
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LOG BOSK
Date : March 28, 1992
Depart ISU : 7:15 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 9:50 AM 1. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 2:00 PM 2. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 4:00 PM 3. Dan Berchenbriter (DAEC)
4. Craig Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
On this trip, some of the earlier transients were repeated at
different severities. This is because the adviser would be expected
to recognize a transient irrespective of it's severity. It is
expected that if severities of 1007,,607.and 307.are used to train
the adviser, it will be able to generalize the transient over the
entire range of severities.
Transients Simulated : RR15 and FW17
RR15 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
June 3, 1991.
(a) The transient at 100_ severity is repeated as the
variables being monitored had changed since the last
time this transient had been simulated.
File Name : RR15A_l.DAT
(b) The transient was simulated at 607.severity.
File Name : RR15A_2.DAT
(c) The transient was simulated at 307.severity.
File Name : RRISA_3.DAT
FW17 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
July 20, 1991.
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Date :June 20, 1992
Depart ISU : 7:18 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 10:06 AM I. Taher Aljundi (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 2:15 PM 2. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 4:15 PM 3. Criag Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
Further simulation were carried out for previously simulated
transients but at different severities.
Transients Simulated : FW18, MS03 and RR30
FW18 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
January 18, 1992. Initial condition IC24, 1007, power,
MOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at 60_, severity.
File Name : FW18A_2.DAT
(b) The transient was simulated at 30_, severity.
File Name : FW18A_3.DAT
MS03 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
February 1, 1992. Initial condition IC24, IOOY, power,
MOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at 6OY, severity.
File Name : MSO3A_2.DAT
(b) The transient was simulated at 30_, severity.
File Name : MSO3A_3.DAT
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RR30 • For a description of this transient, see entry dated
February I, 1992. Initial condition IC24, 1007,power,
MOC.
_a) The transient was simulated at 60_,severity.
File Name : RR30_2.DAT
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Date : July 18, 1992
Depart ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 10:05 AM I. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 2:10 PM 2. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 4:10 PM 3. Criag Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Discussions were held with Craig Hunt about steady states,
system noise, errors in the data over the first few seconds of
simulation, etc.
---> Steady state variations are due to computations based on
physics, and is not o random or computer generated noise..
---> The only simulated noise is on the meter readouts.
---> Boiling noise is not built into the system and so is not
simulated.
Further simulation were carried out for previously simulated
transients but at different severities.
Transients Simulated : RR30, MS02 and MS04.
RR30 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
February. I, 1992. Initial condition IC24, 100% power,
MOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at 30% severity.
File Mame : RRSO_S.DAT
MS02 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
February 15, 1992. Initial condition IC24, 100% power,
MOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at 60% severity.
File Name : MSO2_2.DAT
(b) The transient was simulated at 30% severity.
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File Name ' MSO2_3.DAT
MS04 ' For a description of this transient, see entry dated
February I, 1992. Initial condition IC24, 100_ power,
MOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at 60_,severity.
File Name • MSO4A_2,DAT
(b) Th_ transient was simulated a_ 307,severity.
File Name ' MSO4A_3.DAT
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ISU/DAEC PLANT TRIP
LOG BOOK
Date : October 16, 1992
Depart ISU : 10:10 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 1:15 PM 1 Dr. Eric Bartlett (ISU)
Depart DAEC • 4:00 PM 2 Dr. Richard Danofsky (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 6:10 PM 3 Dr. Dan Bullen (ISU)
4 John Adams (ISU)
5 Anujit Basu (ISU)
6 Eric Daugherty (ISU)
7 Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
8 John Hawkinson (ISU)
9 Keehoon Kim (ISU)
and many Iowa Electric
personnel.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
This trip was mainly an effort to update the executives and
plant personnel about the advances being made on this project.
This was important as Iowa Electric Light and Power company is
donating substantially to the project by way of simulator time
and simulator personnel overtime.
The main agenda of the trip was a presentation by Anujit Basu.
This presentation was an account of Basu's Master's thesis. Anujit
Basu finished his Master's in August 1992, and is supported by
the DOE grant.
The attendees were also introduced to other projects being inves-
tigated by faculty and graduate students in the Nuclear Engineer-
ing program at Iowa State University.
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Date : October 23, 1992
Depart ISU : 7:00 AM In Attendance:
Arrive DAEC : 10:05 AM I. Anujit Basu (ISU)
Depart DAEC : 2:I0 PM 2. Chalapathy Dhanwada (ISU)
Arrive ISU : 4:10 PM 3. Criag Hunt (DAEC)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Discussions with Craig Hunt about the work to be done over the
next few trips. Also discussed about the distinct transients
that caused almost identical effects in the various plant para-
meters, and how neural networks can identify and differentiate
these transients.
Transients Simulated : RX01 and FW04.
RX01 : For a description o_ this transient, see entry dated
February 29, 1992. Initial condition IC24, 1007,power°
MOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at 6OY,severity.
File Name : RXOI_2.DAT
(b) The %ransiont gas simulated at 30% severity.
File Name : RXOI_3.DAT
Note: The wait time in the batch file C.ISUBAT ,as changed to
120 frames (about I0 sec). This gives us a little more normal
operating time at the beginning og each simulation.
FW04 : For a description of this transient, see entry dated
February 29, 1992. Initial condition IC24, 100_ power,
MOC.
(a) The transient was simulated at COY,severity.
File Name : FWO4_2.DAT
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(b) The transient was simulated at 307, severity.
File Name ' FWO4_3.DAT
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9 Descriptionof CollectedMalfunction Data
Thissectioncontainsthedescriptionsofthevariousmalfunctionsthatwere simulated
at the DAEC sim,,lator.These descriptionswere providedby the DAEC simulator
personnel (Gould 1987a& 1987b).
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MALFUNCTION CUIO
Coolant leakage outside the primary containment. Severity is variable: O - 100% =
0 - 4" diameter pipe (single-ended shear). Reactor Water Cleanup System (RW'CS)
expansion joint failure at 100% power. This malfunction will cause a leak to occur
at the cleanup system inlet expansion joint. The leak rate will be determined by the
specified severity.
A low-severity leak will cause the ambient temperature to increase and will actuate
the leak detection system isolation and annunciation at setpoint. As severity
increases the leak detection system will be actuated by area temp/temp
differentials. Prior to isolation, a brief decrease in pressure and flow will indicate
mass loss on the inlet to the RWCS pumps. The pump discharge pressure will
decrease proportional to leak severity and the cleanup system return temperature
will decrease. When the reactor water cleanup system leak detection system
activates, motor valves (MO-2700. 2701, 2740) will close, and the RWCU pumps will
trip. The motor valve position indicating lights will indicate the valves are closed,
and the RWCU pump motor breaker will indicate the breaker is open. The RWCU
leak will cause the system pressure to decrease to atmospheric pressure. The system
flow will decrease resulting in appropriate annunciation. The cleanup holding
pumps will start automatically from the system low flow. System temperature will
slowly decay to ambient, and the heat load on Reactor Building Closed Coolant
Water (RBCCW) will decrease rapidly.
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafiles:
culO.dat: Accident is reactor water cleanup line break outside primary containment
100% break. IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction is
YP:MCU10 at 100%. Decay heat is normal. No operator action.
culOgpS.dat: Accident is reactor water cleanup line break outside primary
containment 100% break. IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction
is YP:MCU10 at 100%. Decay heat is normal. No operator action. Automatic
group 5 isolation is overridden. Valves M02700, 2701, 2740 do not close feedwater
pumps run out trip on delayed overload.
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MALFUNCTION FW02
Malfunction is condensate pump trip.
a. pump a
b. pump h
Generic, breaker overcurrent device (50) failure, i00% power. This malfunction will
cause the selected main condensate pump breaker to trip from a faulty overcurrent
device (50). The condensate pump breaker will indicate open, motor current will
decrease, and annunciation from the trip will occur,
When the condensate pump motor breaker trips, the pump will stop, and pump
discharge pressure and flow will decrease. The corresponding reactor feedwater
pump will trip and the recirculation system will run back low water level of 186" to
45% speed.Condensate header pressure will decrease, and flow will increase as the
remaining condensate pump capacity is exceeded.
If both condensate pumps are tripped, the reactor feedwater pumps will trip. The
recirculation pumps will start to run back at 186" Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
water level to 45% speed.
The reactor will scram when level reaches 170".
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafiles:
fwO2a.dat: Accident is trip of condensate pump A. No loss of power. When a
condensate pump trips, the associated feedwater pump trips automatically. Reactor
trips on low level. The turbine then trips on reverse power. IC24, 100% power,
Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction is YP:MFW02(A) the runback of recirculation
pumps delays the reactor scram.
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MAEFUNCTION FW04
Malfunction is condensate filter demineralization resin injection.
a. filter a
b. filter b
c. filter c
d. filter d
e. filter e
Generic, variable. 1 - 100% = 1 - 5% resin release, resin retention element failure,
100% power. This malfunction will cause the release of resin from the selected
demineralizer filter to the severity selected. Any release of resin into the condensate
system will cause a buildup in the reactor vessel. Irradiation and carryover into the
main steam system will cause the radiation monitoring system to respond to
increased radiation levels and annunciation. High temperature and radiation cause
a large increase in reactor vessel conductivity and a decrease in water pH.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafiles:
fwO4a.dat: Accident is condensate filter demin resin injection causes increase in
vessel conductivity and steam line radiation IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle
(MOC).
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MALFUNCTION FWO9
Malfunction is reactor feedwater pump trip.
a. pump a
b. pump b
Generic, spurious trip signal, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected
main feedwater pump to trip instantly from a spurious trip signal. The pump motor
breaker will trip open and annunciation will activate. The pump pressure and flow
will decrease and the recirculation valve will close, if open.
The main feedwater pump trip will cause a partial loss of feedwater to the reactor,
the level will decrease, and speed is runback to 45% at the recirculation pump.
Reactor and turbine power are reduced accordingly. The feedwater control valves
will modulate and maintain reactor water level in the control band at the reduced
power level. The plant will stabilize at a new lower power. It is possible for low
water level scram because of too high a power level or load line.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafiles:
fwOga.dat: Accident is reactor feedwater pump 'a' trip. IC24, 100% power, Middle
of Cycle (MOC).
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MALFUNCTION FW17
Malfunction is main feedwater line break inside primary containment.
a. Feed line a
b. Feed line b
Generic, variable, 0-100% = 0-16" diameter double-ended shear weld failure on
outlet of check valve, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected feed line
inside the primary containment to shear at the outlet of the check valve to the size
specified by severity. This malfunction is unisolable from the reactor vessel through
the selected feedwater line.
At 100% severity, the rupture will cause a rapid depressurization of the reactor
vessel and feedwater line. The reactor water level will initially increase resulting in a
high-level trip of the main turbine, reactor feed pumps, High Pressure Coolant
Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). Low-Pressure
Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray (CS) will initiate on the resulting
containment pressure of 2 psig and inject into the reactor vessel when reactor
pressure decreases below the shutoff head of the pumps. (Inject valves for LPCI and
CS will not open until reactor pressure decreases below 400 PSIG).
Drywell pressure and temperature will increase rapidly, and at 2 PSI group
isolations 2,3,4,8,9 and reactor scram will occur. Suppression pool temperature and
level will increase in response to the rupture severity. The reactor water level will
decrease rapidly actuating reactor trip, and turbine reactor water
low,low-low,low-low-low isolation signals for groups 1,2,3,4,5,7,8, seal purge.
The core spray, HPCI and LPCI systems will actuate and begin to flood the reactor
with water. The unisoltated rupture will continue to cause mass loss from the
reactor to the drywell and suppression pool. HPCI and RCIC will receive initiation
signals on lo-lo reactor water level. If the reactor pressure is greater than 100 PSIG,
these systems will initiate.
Depending on which feedwater line is broken, HPCI or RCIC will inject to the
reactor vessel. ('A' feedwater line break, RCIC injects to vessel, portion of HPCI bay
inject and rest through break, and the opposite is true of 'B' feedwater line breaks).
The reactor will cooldown in response to the Emergency Core Cooling System
(ECCS),and the event will eventually stabilize. Reactor pressure and drywell
pressure will equalize on large break in very short period of time.
This malfunction is unrecoverable, and the simulator will have to be reinitialized for
malfunction removal.
Datafiles:
fwl7a_2.dat: Accident is main feed water line break. 60% single-ended shear loop A
IC24, 100% power, MOC.
fwl7a_3.dat: Accident is main feed water line break. 30% single-ended shear - loop
A IC24, 100% power, MOC.
473
MALFUNCTION FW18
Malfunctionismain feedwaterlinebreakoutsideprimarycontainment.
a.feedlinea
b.feedlineb
Generic,variable,0-100% = 0-16"diameterdouble-endedshearweldfailureon
outletoffeedregvalve100% power.Thismalfunctionwillcausetheselectedfeed
lineoutsidetheprimarycontainmentoshearattheoutletofthefeedwater
regulatorvalvetothesizespecifiedby severity.
At 100% severity,therupturewillcausethefeedwaterheaderpressuretodecrease
rapidlytolessthanreactorpressure.Headerflowwillincreaserapidlytomaximum,
and thefeedwaterpumps capacitywillbe exceededand tripon lowsuctionpressure
of250 PSIG.Initiallythefeedwateregulatorvalveswillmodulateopen from
steam/feedwatermismatch,thenopen when thedecreasingreactorwaterlevel
overridescontrol.
A reactorscramwilloccurwhen reactorwaterleveldecreasesfromlackof
feedwater,thelowwaterlevelcausesHigh PressureCoolantInjection(HPCI),and
ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC) actuationand begintofloodthereactor
withwaterand eventuallyrecoverthelevel.Group isolationswilloccuratthe
respectives tpoints.
The reactorwillcooldown inresponsetotheEmergencyCoreCoolantSystem
(ECCS),and theeventwilleventuall_rstabilize.Thismalfunctionisunrecoverable,
and thesimulatorwillhavetobereinitializedformalfunctionremoval.
Datafiles:
fwl8a.dat:Accidentismain feedwaterlinebreakoutsideprimarycontainment100o7o
break.
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MALFUNCTION HP05
Malfunction is High. Pressure ('oolant Injection (HPCI) steam supply line break
(HPCI room). Variable, exponential. 0-100% = 0-10" diameter single-ended shear
weld failure on HPCI steam supply line any, HPCI in operation. This malfunction
will cause the HPCI turbine steam supply line to break at the drain pot inlet. The
break size will be specified by severity.
A low severity steam line break will cause the HPCI turbine speed to decrease. The
turbine speed controller will cause the throttle valve to open and return the speed
to setpoint.
As severity increases, the steam flow will increase and the turbine speed/pumping
capacity will decrease. The emergency area cooler will detect a high differential
temperature, high room temperature or high steam flow (300%) caused by the
steam line break and actuate an auto-isolation signal, closing the steam isolation
valves MO-2238, MO-2239, torus suction valves close, and tripping the turbine. The
room fire suppression system may activate at high severities.
The HPCI turbine steam inlet valve HV-2201 will close, the turbine speed will
decrease, and exhaust pressure will go to minimum. The HPCI pump discharge
pressure and flow will decrease as pump capacity is lost. Reactor water level will not
increase from the HPCI system. Without a manual reset the turbine will not
attempt a restart at 119.5".
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafiles:
hpOh_2.dat: Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break
in HPCI room. 6C% single-ended shear IC20, 100% power, End of Cycle (EOC).
hpOh_3.dat: Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break
in HPCI room. 30% single-ended shear IC20, 100% power, End of Cycle (EOC).
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MALFUNCTION HP08
MalfunctionisHighPressureCoolantInjection(HPCI) steamsupplylinebreak
(torusroom),variable,0-100% = 0-I0"diametersingle-endedshear,wel4failureon
HPCI supplylineatM0-2298any,HPCI inoperation.Thismalfunctionwillcause
theHPCI turbinesteamsupplylinetobreakinthetorusroom attheoutletof
M0-2298.The breaksizewillbespecifiedby severity.A low-severitysteamline
breakwillcausetheHPCI turbinespeedtodecrease,and theturbinespeed
controllerwillcausethethrottlevalvetoopenand returnthespeedtosetpoint.
HPCI isolationcan resultifthetorusareatemperatureincreasestothehigh
setpointorhasa highD/T forgreaterthan15minutes.
As severityincreases,thesteamflowwillincrease,and theturbinespeed/pumping
capacitywilldecrease.The excessivesteamflowwillcausea highsteamlineD/P
isolationsignaltobegenerated,closingthesteamisolationvalvesMO-2238,
MO-2239,torussuctionvalvescloseand trippingtheturbine.
The HPCI turbinesteaminletvalveMO-2202 willclose,theturbinespeedwill
decrease,and exhaustpressurewillgo tominimum. The HPCI pump discharge
pressureand flowwilldecreaseaspump capacityislost.Reactorwaterlevelwillnot
increasefrom theHPCI system.Withouta manualresetheturbinewillnot
attempta restartat119.5".
Malfunctionremovalwillrestoretheaffectedcomponentstonormal.Operator
actionmay be requiredtorestoretheplanttonormal.
Datafiles:
hpOS_2.dat: Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break
in torus room. 60% single-ended shear IC20, 100% power, End of Cycle (EOC).
hpO8_3.dat: Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break
in torus room. 30% single-ended shear IC20, 100% power, End of Cycle (SOC).
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MALFUNCTION MC01
Malfunction is main circulating water pump trip.
a. pump a, [p4a
b. pump b, lp4b
Generic, upper motor bearing failure, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the
selected main circulating water-pump motor upper bearing to fail, resulting in a
motor breaker trip on overcurrent.
The circulating water-pump upper motor bearing will fail causing the motor speed
or current to fluctuate. After approximately one minute the motor bearing will seize
and cause a very high current to be drawn by the motor, and the supply breaker
will trip on overcurrent. As the circulating water pump discharges pressure, flow
will decrease, and the pump discharge valve will close. The cooling tower basin level
will increase slightly then return to normal as the system mass rebalances.
With a circulating water pump tripped the circulating water temperatures will
increase across the condensers. Condenser vacuum will decrease, and annunciation
and a turbine trip will result, causing a reactor scram and Reactor Pump Trip
(RPT). The plant protection system will respond appropriately to the turbine trip,
and the plant will stabilize in a post trip condition with Electro-hydraulic Control
(EHC) maintaining reactor pressure with the bypass valves.
_Ialfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
mcOla.dat: Accident is main circulation water pump "a" trip. No loss of power
IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOO). Malfunction is YP:MMCOI(A).
477
MALFUNCTION M$02
Steam leak inside the primary containment. Variable 0 - 100% = 0 - 4" diameter
single ended shear. Caused by RCIC steam line weld failure at elbow instrument
tap (unisolable). 100% power. This malfunction will cause a main steam leak at
RCIC line elbow instrument tap at a rate specified by severity. Very small severities
will cause local heating inside the drywell, a very slight pressure increase, and an
increase in leakage to the drywell floor drain system.
The main steam flow will increase and rx pressure will decrease. The turbine
Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system will detect the pressure decrease and
respond to maintain pressure. With the decreased steam flow the feed flow will
decrease causing the reactor vessel water level to decrease until the level dominates
and stablizes the level.
The drywell pressure and temp will respond quickly to the leak and the high drywell
pressure trip at 2 psig. The HPCI, LPCI, CS and DG's will start, group 2, 3, 4, 5
isolations will activate. If the rx pressure decreases to 850 psig, group 1 isolation
will occur and isolate the turbine bypass system. The rx will continue to blow. down
and the rx pressure and level will decrease consistant with the severity. Reactor
pressure and temperature will decrease rapidly. The torus level and temperature
will increase in response to the rupture.
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
ms02.2.dat: RCIC line break inside primary containment. The simulation was a
60% single ended shear in a 4" din pipe. Initial condition is IC24, 100% power,
Middle of Cycle (MOC). 60% severity.
ms02_3.dat: RCIC line break inside primary containment. The simulation was a
30% single ended shear in a 4" din pipe. Initial condition is IC24, 100% power,
Middle of Cycle (MOC). 30% severity.
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MALFUNCTION MS03
Malfunction is Main Steam Line (MSL) rupture inside primary containment.
a. steam line a
b. steam line b
c. steam line c
d. steam line d
Generic, variable, O- 100% = 0 - 20" diameter double-ended shear piping on flow
restricter at the high pressure instrument tap that feed CRM steam flow
instrumentation, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected main steam
line to rupture at the flow restricter inlet at a rate specified by severity.
At very low severities, local drywell temperatures will increase. Drywell pressure
increase will be small. The drywell floor drain sump will fill up faster, and the
drywell cooling system will indicate temperature increases. At lower severities, the
main steam flow will increase, measured flow will decrease, and reactor pressure will
decrease. The turbine bypass and control valves will modulate close, if open, in an
attempt to increase steam pressure.
The feedwater control system will increase feedflow to control the increased demand.
The hotweU level control system will begin to makeup from the condensate storage
tank to maintain the hotwell level in the normal control band, compensating for the
system mass loss. The drywell temperature/pressure will increase at an appropriate
level consistent with severity.
At higher severities, the excessive main steam pressure decrease will cause the main
turbine control valves to close, attempting to maintain steam pressure. Whenever
the steam line pressure decreases to 8.50 PSIG, the main steam isolation signal and
group I isolation will activate and the Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV) will close,
the reactor will scram, and the turbine bypass system will isolate. The reactor will
continue to blow down, and the reactor pressure and level will decrease consistent
with the severity. The-drywell temperature/pressure increase will cause the ECCS
to activate at 2 PSIG, and group isolation II,III & IV will occur. Reactor pressure
and temperature will decrease rapidly.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
msO3a.dat: Accident is main steam line header double ended shear, 100%. (20"
line). IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
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MALFUNCTION MS04
Malfunction is Main Steam Line (MSL) rupture outside primary containment•
a. steam line a
b. steam line b
c. steam line c
d. steam line d
Generic, variable, 0 - 100% = 0 - 20" diameter double-ended shear, piping failure at
ms common header, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected main
steam line to rupture outside the containment at the turbine inlet header at a rate
specified by severity. At lower severities, the main steam flow will increase, and
reactor pressure will decrease. The turbine bypass and control valves will modulate
close, if open, in an attempt to increase steam pressure to control the increased
demand. The hotwell level control system will begin to makeup from the condensate
storage tank to maintain the hotweU level in the normal control band, compensating
for the system mass loss. A Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) group I
isolation is possible on steam line high temp (200 DEG F), and probability increases
with severity.
At 100% severity, the PCIS group I isolation will be initiated on steam line
low-pressure (850 PSIG in the run mode) with the steam line flow (140%) as a
backup. The reactor will scram on MSIV closure. Because of the rapid steaming
rate, the reactor water level will rapidly increase causing the main turbine and both
reactor feed pumps, HPCI and RCIC, to trip. As the MSIVs close, steam flow
through the break will cease, voids will collapse, and reactor water level will stabilize
at some new lower level. Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) will respond to
maintain adequate core cooling. The pressure rise in the turbine building will cause
the blowout panels to function, releasing the steam cloud to the environment.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
msO4a.dat: Accident is main steam line header double ended shear, 100%. (20"
line). Outside primary containment. I024, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOO).
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MALFUNCTION MSI9
Malfunction is spurious group I isolation.
a. logic "A'
b. logic 'B'
Generic, relay failure, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected group I
isolation relay to fail and cause the isolation signal to be generated.
The failure of logic 'A' will cause the group I isolation annunciator to actuate
without valve response.
The failure of logic 'B' will cause the group I isolation annunciator to actuate
without valve response.
The failure of both logic 'A' and 'B' will cause the below listed inboard/o_:tb_,ard
isolation valves to trip closed. The valve positions will be displayed at the
hand-switches and lC03. The valves are listed below:
M0-4423 M0-4424 CV-4639 CV-4640 CV-4412 CV-4415
CV-4418 CV-4420 CV-4413 CV-4416 CV-4419 CV-4421
The closing of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) inboard or outboard will
result in a reactor scram, turbine trip, and plant shutdown. Reactor high pressure
will activate the Low Low Set (LLS), and reactor pressure will be controlled at
about 900 to 1020 PSIG.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
mslgab.dat: Accident is feedwater relay failures A and B logic causing a group I
isolation. IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
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MALFUNCTION RP05
MalfunctionRPS scramcircuitfailure(ATWS).
a.auto-scramfailure
b.manual-scramfailure
c.ARI failure
d.RPS fuseremovalfailure
e.allindividualrod-scramswitchesfail
f.hydrauliclock-scramdischargevolume
Discrete,RPS scram circuitnternalshortcircuitinwiring(A,B,C,D,E)scram
dischargevolumeblockage(F),100% power.Thismalfunctionwillcausethe
selectedRPS scramcircuittofailtocausea reactorscram when actuated.
(A,B,C,D,E)selectionOfthehydrauliclockmalfunctionwillreducethescram
dischargevolumetosimulateflowblockage.
Iftheauto-scramisselectedforfailure,theplantwillrespondtotheeffectsofthe
conditionthatgeneratedthescramsignal.The annunciatorsand indicationswill
respondtoauto-scraminputsastheyaregenerated.However,theplantwillremain
operatinguntila protectionfeatureorinjectionfsodiumperttaboratecausesthe
planttoshutdown.The reactorhasthemanual-scramcapabilityfunctional,and the
operatorcan utilizethismode asdesired.
With an activeauto-scram,theplantwillscr_masrequiredby logicwheneverthe
appropriateconditionexists.
A failureofARI tocausea scramwillalsocausea failureoftheRPT breakersto
tripon lo-loreactorwaterlevel,highreactorpressure,ormanualinitiationofARI.
The effectsofthemanual-scramfeaturefailureswouldbe theresponsefailureofthe
functiontorespondwhen activatedmanually.
RPS fuseremovalfailuresimulatesa failureoftheRPS fuseremovaltowork.
Failureoftherod-scramswitchesimulatesa failureofall89scramswitchestowork.
The hydrauliclockmalfunctionreducesthevolumeand willallowtherodsto
partially insert, with each scram signal/reset applied.
Insertion of all (6) generic failures will result in a "ATWS" condition.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafiles:
rpO5tcOl.dat: Accident is trip of ma_n t,zrbine together with failure to scram
(ATWS). No operator action. 1C24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
Malfunction is YP:MTCOI (turbine trip) followed by YP:MRF05(A) (failure to
•automaticaliy scram). Scram will be delayed and slow. Scram is from alternate rod
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insert (ARI). Recirculation pumps also trip on ARI. ARI is triggered at U9" vessel
level or 1140 PSIG vessel pressure. Recirculation pump trips at turbine control
valves fast closure or stop valves less than 90% open.
rpSactcl.dat: Accident is trip of main turbine together with failure to scram
(ATWS), and Alternate Rod Insert (ARI). No operator action. IC24, 100% power,
Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction is YP:MTCO1 (turbine trip) followed by
YF:MRP05(A) (failure to automatically scram) and YP:MRP0,5(C) (failure of
ARI). Recirculation pump trips on turbine control valves fast closure or stop valves
less than 90% open.
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MALFUNCTION RR10
Malfunction recirculation pump speed feedback signal failure.
a. pump a
b. pump b
Generic. variable, 0 - 100% = 0 - 100% of feedback signal, speed control circuit
failure, 50% power. This malfunction will cause the selected recirculation pump
speed-control feedback circuit to fail to the specified severity. The pump speed
indicator will fail to the specified severity. With the tacho-generator signal failing
below the speed demand/manual pot position signal, the recirculation pump actual
speed will increase, and the scoop tube will increase to maximum or auto lock if
auto-lo_:k conditions are met. With the tacho-generator signal failing above the
speed demand/manual pot position signal, the recirculation actual speed will
decrease to minimum.
The resulting effect on the plant will be the increase in power for an increased
recirculation flow and a decrease in power for a decreased recirculation flow.
Turbine generator power and control valve positions will respond as appropriate.
Annunciator response to flow limits and control failures will actuate at setpoint.
Reactor water level will respond to the opposite of the recirculation speed initially
until feedflow and steam flow can get matched at the proper water level.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
rrlO.dat: Accident is recirculation pump speed feedback signal failure caused by
speed circuit control failure IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
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MALFUNCTION RR15
Malfunction is recirculation loop rupture (design basis Loss of Coolant Accident
(LOCA) at 100%).
a. loop a
b. loop b
Generic, variable, 0 - 100% = 0 - 22" diameter double-ended shear piping failure at
recirc pump suction, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected
recirculation loop, inside the primary containment, to shear at the recirculation
pump suction to the size specified by severity.
At 100% severity, the rupture will cause the recirculation loop and reactor pressure
to decrease rapidly. The affected loop recirculation pump will cavitate and flow will
be lost. Reactor water level will decrease rapidly as the reactor blows down through
the rupture into the containment. The reactor water level decrease will actuate
reactor scram, and reactor water level low, low-low, low-low-low isolation signals for
groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, seal purge. The Core Spray (CS), High-Pressure Coolant
Injection (HPCI), Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), DG, and ADS systems
will actuate and begin to flood the reactor with water. The RR pump discharge
valves will close on the non-broken loop on the LPCI loop select signal. Reactor
feed pumps will trip on overcurrent.
At 100% severity, the HPCI and RCIC will receive initiation signals. However, the
reactor pressure will decrease so fast that they will trip and isolate on low pressure
before they will have any noticeable effect. Drywell pressure and temperature will
increase rapidly and at 2 PSI group isolations 2,3,4,8,9 will occur. Suppression pool
temperature and level will increase in response to the rupture severity. The reactor
will cooldown in response to the Emergency Core Coolant System (ECCS), and the
event will eventually stabilize.
This malfunction is unrecoverable, and the simulator will have to be reinitialized for
malfunction removal.
Datafiles:
rrl5a_2.dat: Accident is recirculation loop rupture. 60% double-ended shear- loop a
IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
rrl5a_3.dat: Accident is recirculation loop rupture. 30% double-ended shear - loop a
IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
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MALFUNCTION RR30
Malfunction is coolant leakage inside primary containment. Variable (exponential),
0 - 100% = 0 -2" diameter pipe (double-ended shear) reactor vessel bottom drain
weld failure. 100% power. This malfunction will cause reactor coolant to leak from
the reactor vessel bottom drain failed weld at a rate specified by severity. As
severity increases the mass loss from the reactor will easily be made up for by the
hotwell level control system. In fact, at 100% severity the effects on reactor
level/hotwell level will be very small. The most effective display of mass loss will be
at hot standby.
At 100% severity, drywell pressure, temperature, and activity will increase. At 2
PSI, group isolations 2,3,4,5,8 will occur. Suppression pool temperature and level
will increase in response to the rupture severity. The reactor scram will result from
the 2 PSIG drywell pressure, and a turbine trip will result from reserve power.
The shutdown plant will cooldown in response to the Emergency Core Cooling
(ECC) and will stabilize. The longterm effect of the leak will be the transfer of the
Condensate Storage Tanks (CST) mass to the suppression pool via the leak in the
reactor vessel.
At small severities where the drywell pressure remains below 2 PSIG, the floor drain
equipment system will see a high leak (in excess of the 5 GPM tech spec limit). The
drywell cooler heat load will increase as seen on the cooler temperatures on IC25.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
rr30.dat: Accident is reactor bottom head drain 100% single-ended shear (2" line).
IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
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MALFUNCTION RXOI
._Ialfunction is fuel cladding failure. Variable, exponential, 0 -100% = 0 - 30% fuel
clad damage, fuel cladding degradation. 100% power. This malfunction will cause
the fuel cladding to fail to a value specified by severity.
As the fuel failure increases, the amount of activity in the reactor recirculation and
main steam system will increase. This activity will propagate throughout the plant
and the radiation monitoring system will detect, indicate, and alarm as the activity
increases. At low severities, of[gas post-treat radiation monitors will cause offgas to
isolate (without a group isolation) resulting in a loss of condenser vacuum, main
turbine trips, and reactor scram. As the severity increases, the main steam line
radiation monitors will cause main steam line isolation and reactor scram at
setpoint. As the normal power dependent background radiation levels decrease, the
additional radiation levels will be more evident on area and process monitors. At
high severities the before mentioned will occur faster with more dramatic increases•
Various system trips and isolations will occur, protecting the environment from
excessive discharges.
The sequence of the fuel failure indication will be as follows:
1. Offgas pretreat and post-treat radiation monitors increase
2. Offgas stack release will start to increase
3. Offgas system isolates on post-treat hi-hi radiation level
4. Main steam line radiation monitors respond:
a. MSL high radiation alarm
b. Group I isolation
c. Reactor scram
5. Drywell monitors increase
6. Torus radiation monitors increase from relief valve discharge or HPCI and/or
RCIC exhaust.
7. Reactor building area radiation increases from Emergency Core Cooling
System (ECCS) system operation. (HPCI, RCIC, LPCI, CS).
NOTE: Malfunction severity will cause some of the above items to be "passed over"
or will result in a delayed response.
Datafile:
rxOl.dat: Accident is 30% fuel clad failure. Causes high radiation alarm to go off
IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
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MALFUNCTION TC02
Malfunction is EItC hydraulic pump trip.
a. pump a
b. pump b
Generic, motor failure, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected EHC
pump motor to fail and trip on overload. The starter will open, and an annunciator
will actuate.
The unaffected EHC pump will start when the low pressure annunciator actuates at
1300 PSIG EHC system pressure.
If the unaffected EHC pump is unavailable or both EHC pumps are failed, the
turbine will trip at 1100 PSIG EHC system pressure. When the turbine trip is
initiated, the turbine stop valves, control valves, and combined intermediate valves
will rapidly close. The reactor/main steam pressure increases rapidly activating the
turbine bypass system. The turbine bypass system will modulate as necessary to
control the steam pressure by dumping steam to the main condenser. A reactor
scram will occur as a result of the turbine trip. Recirculation pumps will trip when
the RPT breakers open from a turbine trip.
4KV bus close-circuit transfer is initiated. The main generator 286/B lockout relay
will actuate from the anti-motoring trip protection. The main generator output
breakers 352-H and/or 352-I will trip open and lockout. The generator exciter field
breaker will open. Generator indication of current, voltage, megawatts, megavars,
etc. will decrease to zero. Appropriate annunciators for generator trip will actuate.
The plant will stabilize in a post shutdown condition.
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator
action may be required to restore the plant to normal.
Datafile:
tcO2.dat: Accident is EHC hydraulic pump trip causes pump motors to fail and trip
on overload. IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC).
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L,
INITIAL CONDITIONS IC
The fuel cycle of a reactor is defined as the preparation, utilization, and ultimate
disposal after use of the fuel. The fuel cycle may be divided into three categories
depending the time for which the fuel was in the reactor. They are:
1. Beginning of Cycle (BOC)
2. Middle of Cycle (MOC)
3. End of Cycle (EOC)
Conditions pertaining to BOC, MOC or EOC can be simulated. The reactor
response to a malfunction can differ for these conditions. The following data tiles
were obtained for spurious scram with various initial conditions.
Datafiles:
icl4scra.dat: Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. ICl4, 100% power,
BOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03.
ic20scrl.dat: Accident is spurious scram with operator action. IC20, 100% power,
EOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03. Decay heat is 10% of full power. Operator action
is according to integrated plant operating instruction (IPOI) NO. 5 - reactor scram.
Actions include: mode switch to shutdown position, feedwater level controller to 175
inches, use reactor water cleanup to maintain RPV level, trip 'A' feed and
condensate pumps, manually control.feed regulator valves, insert M1 Source Range
Monitor (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) detectors. Level was not
adequately controlled, and both feed pumps and turbine tripped on high RP V level
(212 inches).
ic20scr2.dat: Accident is spurious scram with operator action. IC20, 100% power,
EOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03. Decay heat is 10% of full power. Operator action
is according to Integrated Plant Operating Instruction (IPOI) NO. 5 - reactor
scram. Actions include: mode switch to shutdown position, feedwater level
controller to 175 inches, use reactor water cleanup to maintain RPV levell trip 'A'
feed and condensate pumps, manually control feed regulator valves, insert ali SRM
and IRM detectors. Level was manually controlled to prevent the trip of feed pumps
and turbine.
ic20scrm.dat: Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC20, 100% power,
EOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03.
ic22scrm.dat: Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC22, 25% power,
BOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03.
ic23scrm.dat: Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC23, 75% power,
BOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03.
ic24scrm.dat: Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC24, 100% power,
MOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03.
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